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Introduction
Our social networks affect our beliefs, decisions, and behaviors as the people we interact
with on a regular basis transmit information about new technologies, job opportunities,
or political opinions. They provide us with resources through informal insurance net-
works and remittances, and shape our education and occupation decisions. Comparing
ourselves to our peers shapes our identities and the social norms we follow, and being
exposed to role models affects our aspiration and reference points.
This thesis explores how social networks influence political participation, and the
decisions of firm owners through information, social norms, and reference points. I
analyze the effects of a different social network and environment through international
migration, and the impact of being exposed to information about one’s peers in two
field experiments. I study these questions in the context of a low-income country that
has experienced decades of social conflict and war - Mozambique. Social unrest as well
as the consequences of natural disasters forced many of the Mozambicans living in rural
areas to migrate to neighboring African countries and the urban areas of Mozambique.
In the first chapter, co-authored with Catia Batista and Pedro Vicente, we exploit
the quasi-experimental nature of the drivers of migration from Mozambique to, mainly,
South Africa to study how emigrating to a country with stronger political participation
norms affects political attitudes and participation at home. Specifically, we identify the
type of migrant social networks that changes political behavior, and the two primary
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channels that drive these changes. We develop a theoretical framework that suggests
that migration might change the social norms for political participation as well as
improve knowledge about better quality political institutions. International migration
might thus increase political awareness and participation both by migrants and by other
individuals in their networks.
To test this hypothesis, we use detailed data on different types of migrant networks,
namely geographic, kinship and chatting networks, as well as different measures of po-
litical participation and electoral knowledge. During the 2009 elections in Mozambique
a team of enumerators collected data on self-reports, behavioral and actual voting mea-
sures. The nature of this data allows us to distinguish between the effect of international
migration on political attitudes and actual behavior as well as between effects driven
by changes in social norms and those driven by increased knowledge. The empirical
results show that the number of migrants an individual is in close contact through regu-
lar chatting within a village significantly increases political participation of residents in
that village – more so than family links to migrants. Whereas family links are equally
effective in changing political attitudes, they have little effect on political participation.
Additionally, chatting networks effectively change both the social norms of political par-
ticipation and transmit knowledge about electoral processes. These results are robust
to controlling for self-selection into migration as well as endogenous network formation.
The chapter shows that even in the many contexts of South-South migration where
both countries of origin and destination are imperfect political systems there may be
domestic gains arising from international emigration.
Whereas the first chapter studies the effect of changing the social network itself,
in the second chapter I analyze how an individual’s relative position within her social
network affects behavior in the context of micro-entrepreneurs. In Mozambique, as
well as in many other developing countries, the supply of salaried jobs does not meet
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the demand from internal migrants coming to the capital Maputo. As a consequence,
many resort to self-employment in the urban market clusters or streets serving their
neighborhoods. These firm owners often have no formal business training, financial
literacy, or access to capital. Their businesses operate on very low productivity levels,
often run out of stock and have to be closed, and rarely grow to provide employment
opportunities or contribute to the formal economy.
Additionally to having limited access to classical inputs such as capital and technol-
ogy, micro-firm owners face behavioral growth constraints. Firm owners have incom-
plete information about attainable incomes, and their relative performance standing.
This in turn might affect their beliefs about the quality of their business network and
the returns to effort. These incorrect beliefs lead to sub-optimal choices that stunt firm
growth. In the second chapter, I study whether feedback on relative performance stand-
ing affects beliefs and, as a consequence, firm output. I exploit data from a unique field
experiment that provides causal evidence of the effect of performance rankings on firm
outputs. Firm owners in the treatment group observed their relative position within
their sector as well as their peers’ revenue data. One year after the intervention, at
baseline high-performers are not affected by the treatment as the ranking contains only
limited new information for them. However, low-performing firm owners at baseline
significantly increase their revenues compared to low-performers in a control group.
Treated low-performers close the performance gap to high-performing peers by 43%.
This effect is, largely, explained by significant increases in work hours and pro-social
behavior. Exploiting variation in the observability of peer characteristics, I show that
the treatment is particularly effective when subjects observe that the most successful
peer is a woman. Low-performers that, additionally to their own ranking, observe a
female top seller, outperform at baseline high-performers by 14%.
The last chapter provides empirical evidence on the relationship between refer-
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ence dependence and micro-firm growth. A lack of positive role models of successful
entrepreneurs such as in the Mozambican context where most entrepreneurs operate
subsistence businesses might imply low aspiration levels of firm owners. If we con-
sider that small firms might not be profit-maximizing but instead be reference- and
aspirations-constrained, an intervention focusing on increasing aspirations and chang-
ing an entrepreneurs reference point might be successful in fostering micro-firm growth.
To test this hypothesis the third chapter, co-authored with Catia Batista, analyzes
a randomized control trial designed to isolate the impact of reference points on en-
trepreneurship.
Approximately 600 micro-entrepreneurs were randomized into treatments providing
information about a role model, additionally the importance of establishing realistic
goals, and how to maintain funds within their enterprises. Six months after imple-
mentation we find significant positive effects of shifts in aspirations on effort levels and
savings. These effects are maintained and can still be precisely estimated one year
after implementation. On average, changes in investment behavior translate to revenue
increases of 40%-45% compared to a control group. In contrast, human capital im-
provements have no effect on investment behavior. Furthermore, setting business goals
mitigates the positive effects of role models on economic growth. Despite similar effects
on effort levels, participants that condition their reference points on a one-year goal
save less and the positive effects on revenues disappears over time.
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Chapter 1
Migration, Political Institutions,
and Social Networks
1.1 Introduction
The economic importance of international migration has been increasing steadily in
the recent decades. Not only has the number of labor migrants increased massively,
but also the financial flows generated by these migrants have been rising rapidly, often
surpassing the national budgets of many developing countries.1 As a result, the strand
of economics literature that examines the potentially positive effects of emigration on
the economic development of origin countries has been growing. It highlights that the
positive effects of emigration on economic development may happen as a result of a
number of mechanisms such as overcoming liquidity constraints through remittances,
promoting human capital accumulation and entrepreneurship, and increasing foreign
direct investment and international trade.2 While the importance of good political
1World Bank (2018) “Moving for Prosperity – Global Migration and Labor Markets”.
2Edwards and Ureta (2003) and Yang (2008) described how remittances may provide the financial
resources to overcome credit constraints in migrant sending countries. Furthermore, return migration
may bring not only financial resources, but also human capital, which can promote entrepreneurship
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institutions for economic development is by now well established, as influentially de-
scribed by Acemoglu et al. (2005), one area that has deserved relatively less attention
in the economics literature is the relationship between international migration and the
quality of political institutions in countries of migrant origin.3
The main objective of this paper is to make a specific contribution to this litera-
ture by examining in detail different mechanisms through which international migration
may play a role in the diffusion of improved political attitudes and behavior of those
left behind. For this purpose, we make use of a number of different measures of po-
litical participation (namely self-reports, behavioral and actual measures of political
behavior), and of different types of migrant social networks (geographical, kinship, and
chatting networks).
We start by proposing a theoretical framework where migration might change indi-
vidual social identities and in this way intrinsic motivation for political participation,
while it may also improve information and knowledge about better quality political in-
stitutions. Through these mechanisms, international migration might increase political
awareness and participation. This effect may not only influence migrants themselves,
but also trigger peer effects - thus impacting the social network of current and return
migrants in their country of origin.
In order to evaluate whether international migration may foster political partic-
ipation, and examine the importance of different types of migrant networks in this
and economic growth, as in Mesnard and Ravallion (2006) and Batista et al. (2017). Migrant networks
may also foster increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and international trade, as found by Gould
(1994), Rauch and Trindade (2002), Kugler and Rapoport (2007) or Javorcik et al. (2011). An addi-
tional possibility empirically examined and supported by Beine et al. (2008) and Batista et al. (2012) is
the “brain gain” hypothesis put forward by Mountford (1997) and Stark et al. (1997, 1998), according
to which the simple prospect of emigration can promote human capital accumulation in migrant origin
countries.
3Throughout this paper, we define the quality of political institutions as combining compliance
to the electoral principle of democracy where rulers are made responsive to citizens through periodic
elections, together with compliance to the participatory principle that can be summarized as active
participation by citizens in all political processes - including not only elections, but also other forms
of political engagement, as described by Coppedge et al. (2016).
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transmission process, we exploit data from nationally representative household surveys
conducted immediately before and after the 2009 national elections in Mozambique.
These elections followed the lowest election turnout ever in Mozambique in 2004 (36%
according to official numbers), which was also the lowest among all SADC countries.
Because Mozambique is a country with substantial emigration to neighboring coun-
tries (especially to South Africa), this therefore seems like an ideal context in which to
study the role of the increasingly important but relatively understudied South-South
migration in transmitting norms in a context of imperfect democracies.
Our empirical analysis investigates whether an individual who is connected to one or
more international migrants is affected differently in terms of his/her political attitudes
and behavior depending on the characteristics of these connections. To evaluate in
detail the different diffusion mechanisms of information and political attitudes through
international migrant networks, we use different migrant network measures. Specifically,
we distinguish between migrant geographical networks, i.e. how many households with
at least one migrant in the family exist in the respondent’s village; migrant kinship
networks, i.e. the number of migrant households that are related by family links to
the respondent; and migrant chatting networks, i.e. the number of migrant households
the respondent regularly chats with. In order to test our theoretical hypotheses, this
paper uses several survey and behavioral measures related to political participation and
electoral knowledge – namely, self-reported voting behavior; a measure of actual voter
turnout; a measure of electoral information; and a behavioral measure reflecting the
respondents’ intrinsic motivation for political participation.
For the purpose of investigating the relationship between migrant social networks
and political attitudes and behavior, we estimate a Linear Probability Model (LPM),
controlling for individual, household, and location characteristics. Because interna-
tional migration may potentially be correlated with political attitudes via unobserved
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factors that cannot be controlled for in our regressions, we also conduct Two-Stage
Least Squares (2SLS) regressions that exploit ‘quasi-natural experiments’ given by the
history of natural catastrophes that may plausibly have exogenously created migration
flows. In addition, acknowledging the possibility of endogenous migrant network forma-
tion, particularly in the cases of chatting and kinship, we use secondary network links
(“friends of friends” in the case of chatting networks) as an exclusion restriction to limit
the potential correlation between the characteristics of individuals in Mozambique and
the migrants in their networks.
The empirical results we obtain suggest that political participation can be learned
and valued more highly when people migrate to countries with better quality political
institutions, and that the newly obtained political participation norms may be passed
on to peers. We confirm existing results on the positive effects of living close to mi-
grant households on political engagement – for example, Batista and Vicente (2011) for
Cape Verde. In addition, we find that increased political participation during elections
seems to be mainly driven through contact with migrant households via regular chat-
ting, rather than via family links to migrants. The evidence we examine is consistent
with both information transmission and changed social norms for political participation
via chatting with migrants. Family links seem to convey some information about the
political process, but do not seem to significantly affect intrinsic motivation for politi-
cal participation. Our findings are robust to endogeneity concerns about unobservable
self-selection of migrants and endogenous network formation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents a broad
literature review on the relationship between international emigration and political
remittances, and the original contribution of this paper. Section 1.3 proposes a theo-
retical framework to describe different ways through which migratory experiences may
influence political behavior. Section 1.4 describes the country context under which
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the empirical part of this study was carried out. Next, section 1.5 follows with an
introduction to the dataset and its descriptive statistics. Section 1.6 puts forward an
econometric model and estimation strategy for the effects of interest. Finally, section
1.7 presents the empirical results of the LPM and 2SLS estimations and robustness
tests, and section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
The economic, political and social importance of financial remittances sent by migrants
to their home countries has by now been well-established and the focus of a large body
of literature.4 It has only been more recently that social scientists have focused their
attention on the impacts of “social remittances”. This designation was proposed by
Levitt (1998) to emphasize that, in addition to financial remittances, migrants transfer
new knowledge, practices, and norms to their countries of origin. Examples of social
remittances that migrants may transfer back to their home countries are increased
valuation of education and health, fertility norms, improved organizational skills and
entrepreneurship, and higher demand for political accountability.
The question of whether international migration improves the quality of the domes-
tic political system in the migrant countries of origin is related to the traditional “brain
drain” debate put forward by Gruber and Scott (1966) and Bhagwati and Hamada
(1974). Indeed, emigration has been traditionally regarded as hurting the supply of
well-prepared individuals who can directly supply political services if those who leave
are the best qualified to provide these services. In addition, the political system would
also be negatively affected if emigration acts as a “safety valve” or “outside option”
that makes individuals unhappy with the political status quo to leave their home coun-
4Brown and Jimenez-Soto (2015) provide a recent overview.
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try thereby dampening the demand for better political institutions. This view follows
Hirschman (1970)’s “exit” vs. “voice” dichotomy, according to which citizens unhappy
with the domestic situation either choose to emigrate (exit) or to protest and contribute
to political change (voice). In this setting emigration could be understood as a “safety
valve”, which released protest intensity in the home political system and therefore re-
duced demand for political improvements.
One can however argue that emigration may improve political regimes in several
ways: diaspora effects brought about by current emigrants may promote political change
by influencing local authorities to increase governance (supply side), or by intensified
contact of the domestic population with better institutions abroad thereby promoting
a desire for greater accountability (demand side); return emigrants experiencing an
enriching environment abroad may also improve the quality of the domestic governments
upon return by direct participation in the political system (supply side), or by bringing
increased awareness and demand for political accountability (demand side).
The question of how emigration affects the quality of domestic politics is therefore
an empirical question. This paper focuses specifically on examining the demand side
of the political system by studying the impact of migrant networks on the political
attitudes and behavior of those left behind.
Levitt (1998)’s notion of “social remittances” has been followed by a large number
of contributions in demography, economics, political science, and sociology illustrat-
ing how migration can change political attitudes and behavior in countries of origin.5
Initial contributions, such as Kapur and McHale (2005) or Kapur (2010), highlighted
the promise of social remittances as tools for economic development of countries of
migrant origin. Most early contributions studying how emigration has changed politics
5The concept of social remittances is necessarily grounded on the assumption that migrants assim-
ilate social norms of the countries of destination. Evidence that migrants assimilate political norms
in their host countries of migration is provided by Careja and Emmenegger (2012) and Chauvet et al.
(2016) for very different contexts – respectively, Central and Eastern Europe, and Mali.
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in countries of origin focused on the case of Mexico. Electoral outcomes were often
described as more aligned with democratic values in high emigration areas, although
political engagement and public good provision were observed to be affected positively
or negatively depending on the specifics of the analysis.6
Spilimbergo (2009) conducted one of the first cross-country quantitative studies
on the effects of migration on democratization by examining the impact of foreign
education acquired in democratic countries on fostering democracy in student origin
countries. He showed that migration may promote democracy, but left the question
unanswered as to which specific mechanisms underlie this effect. Docquier et al. (2016)
presented cross-country evidence of the positive impact of unskilled emigration from
developing countries to OECD countries on the institutional quality of origin countries
by using aggregate measures of democracy and economic freedom. The authors found
significant institutional gains from the “brain drain” over the long run after considering
incentive effects on human capital formation. They attribute these effects to an increase
in the exposure of home country population to democratic values and norms. In a
related study, Beine and Sekkat (2013) find suggestive cross-country evidence that the
transmission of political norms seems to be stronger when emigrants are more educated.
Lodigiani and Salomone (2015) describe how international migration to countries with
higher female parliamentary participation has a positive and significant effect on the
female parliamentary share at origin.
A related branch of literature has focused on the relation between financial remit-
tances and political variables, and how these seem to be strongly correlated. O’Mahony
(2013) shows that migrant remittances increase in election years particularly when elec-
tions are more contested and the home country poorer. Ahmad (2012, 2013) provide
evidence that migrant remittances may deter political change, particularly in autocratic
6See, for example, Burgess (2005); Goodman and Hiskey (2008); Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow
(2010); Aparicio and Meseguer (2012); Pfutze (2012).
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regimes, although this effect may be counteracted by remittances being used to pay for
private forms of local public goods - which may reduce the effectiveness of state patron-
age, and in this way promote political change (Adida and Girod (2010); Doyle (2015);
Pfutze (2014); Tyburski (2012)).
Finally, related recent contributions (for example, Miller and Peters (2018); Peters
and Miller (2018)) emphasize the role of emigration in reducing violent conflict – while
showing that emigration to countries with better institutions may increase the more
effective non-violent demand for political change, consistent with our results.
Most of the earlier empirical contributions use aggregate macroeconomic data and
explore cross-country variation. For this reason, they cannot distinguish between sup-
ply and demand forces, nor capture in detail the mechanisms underlying the effects they
identify. Batista and Vicente (2011) provided the first study to use both household-level
survey and behavioral data from a voting experiment to examine the differential effects
of return and current migrants, while also distinguishing between the impact of differ-
ent countries of destination with varying degrees of governance. They found stronger
results for the impact of return migrants - a result later corroborated by Chauvet and
Mercier (2014), Mercier (2016), and Tuccio et al. (2016) which emphasized the role of
return migration in promoting political participation and electoral competitiveness in
various countries of migrant origin. Batista and Vicente (2011) also showed how im-
proved levels of governance in different host countries (namely the United States relative
to Portugal) positively influenced the magnitude of the migratory impact on demand
for more political accountability. Barsbai et al. (2017) also support these findings by
exploiting community and individual-level data from Moldova, as well as migration pat-
terns to countries with different political regimes. In particular, they find that exposure
to Western democratic values and norms promoted political change in municipalities
with a higher number of emigrants. While the approach by Batista and Vicente (2011)
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is innovative in the sense that it employs behavioral data, and points towards return
migration from countries with better quality institutions as the driving force for the
effect of emigration on political attitudes and behavior in countries of origin, it cannot
explain how individual-level relationships with migrants affect the demand for better
political institutions.
A different strand of literature focuses precisely on the diffusion of political values
through social networks. Fafchamps and Vicente (2013) and Fafchamps et al. (2018)
show that increasing the political literacy of experiment participants changed percep-
tions and electoral behavior, respectively, for those participants with more network
connections, even if they were not directly targeted by the literacy campaign. Giné and
Mansuri (2018) relate closely to this idea as they find positive spillover effects of an
awareness campaign in Pakistan on female voter turnout. Similarly, Nickerson (2008)
finds that about 60% of the propensity to vote is passed on to another household mem-
ber in a randomized controlled trial in the United States. These findings suggest that
norms about political participation are adopted and passed on to peers.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in at least three different ways.
First, our work innovates by examining the diffusion of political norms and informa-
tion about electoral processes through different types of migrant networks – which we
measure using detailed data on geographical networks, kinship networks, and chatting
networks. More generally, our paper contributes by using a variety of political par-
ticipation measures (self-reports, behavioral and actual voting measures) showing that
stronger links with international emigrants increase the likelihood of domestic politi-
cal participation by those left-behind. Finally, we contribute by studying the case of
Mozambique, a country with substantial South-South emigration, almost exclusively to
other sub-Saharan African countries. This is a setting where both migrant countries of
origin and destination are imperfect democracies, and where the empirical question of
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whether migrants can transfer improved political norms is not trivial or captured by
the existing literature.
1.3 Theoretical Framework
Political participation is traditionally modeled as the outcome of an expected cost-
benefit analysis.7 An individual’s benefit from political participation is defined as the
expected utility derived from the outcome of a political process, and from an individual’s
intrinsic motivation. The cost of casting a vote can be broadly thought of as including
the opportunity cost of going to the local polling station or the cost to obtain the
necessary information about election candidates. An individual j can thus be thought
of as maximizing the following expected utility function
max
xj
EΩjU
(
G (xj, x−j) , Ij
(
xj;Pcj
))− cost (xj) (1.3.1)
where the outcome of a political process is described by the functionG (xj, x−j), xj is
the action vector of individual j, and x−j reflects the combined action of all individuals
other than j; Ij is individual j’s intrinsic motivation; Pcj is individual j’s prescribed
behavior given his assignment to social category cj; Ωj is the information set available
to individual j; and cost(xj) is the cost for individual j of taking action xj. Note that
in this framework own actions and actions taken by others do not enter the utility
function directly as, for example, casting a vote might not necessarily directly impact
one’s utility. The individual maximizes its net expected utility of taking a certain action
given the actions of everybody else.
We define intrinsic motivation through an individual’s identity, following Akerlof
and Kranton (2000). For this purpose, let there be a set of social categories C.8 An in-
7See Dhillon and Peralta (2002) for a detailed description.
8A social category could be gender or ethnic group, though our model allows for more complex or
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dividual j assigns himself to one of these categories, cj, given his characteristics, εj. The
determining characteristics that we take as drivers of political behavior through iden-
tity, and are thus relevant in the context of this paper, are an individual’s gender, age,
income, and most importantly for our case the society (which can be summarized by
the geographical location) this individual lives in. Note that individual self-assignment
may be unconscious, and differ from the social category others might assign an indi-
vidual to. Each individual furthermore has a notion about the social categories of all
other individuals, c−j.9
Whether or not an individual derives utility gains or losses from intrinsic motivation
is determined by the individual’s actions, xj, and whether or not these actions are
according to the prescriptions Pcj associated with the individual’s social category cj.
We can think of these prescriptions as widely accepted norms that individuals follow
to maintain their self-image. In the context of political participation, the impact of
intrinsic motivation can be illustrated by the following example: in a society where
casting a vote is the social norm, an individual might decide to vote despite no direct
expected net benefits from it, as he derives intrinsic motivation utility gains by acting
according with the social norms.
In this context, the set of prescriptions Pcj can be described as:
Pcj = P (x−j; cj (εj)) (1.3.2)
where prescriptions Pcj , that determine an individual’s behavior, firstly depend on
the social category cj individual j attributes himself to. Belonging to this social category
itself depends on characteristics εj of individual j, such as his geographical location.
narrower definitions of a social category.
9Being able to classify others in a social category (or box) helps an individual to interpret the
behavior of others as appropriate or not, and copy behavioral patterns of peers belonging to the same
social category.
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Prescriptions also depend on the actions of others, xj, to the extent that they reflect
the behavior of other individuals perceived as belonging to the same social category
and in this way, establish the prescribed standard of social norms.
The solution to the expected utility maximization problem (1.3.1) yields that the
individual’s expected marginal payoff from political participation has to be at least as
high as the marginal cost of action.
EΩjU
′
xj
(
G (xj, x−j) , Ij
(
xj;Pcj
))
= cost′ xj (xj) (1.3.3)
The theoretical framework just described allows us to examine two distinct channels
through which migration may affect political behavior: a change in an individual’s
identity and thereby intrinsic motivation for political action, and a learning mechanism
based on increased knowledge about political processes.
An individual that emigrates becomes exposed to a different environment. This
change in surroundings affects the migrant’s social category self-assignment, as it de-
pends on the individual location. As the prescribed behavior Pcj depends on individual
j’s social category, the individual faces different prescriptions after emigration. To
avoid net utility losses, the individual migrant should update her political behavior xj
accordingly. This direct impact of migration on xj may be thought of as what happens
when an individual migrates and adopts different standards of political behavior – while
he is still abroad or upon return to the home country.
A second more indirect effect of migration on political behavior may happen through
the actions of others, independently of own migratory experiences. This effect may
happen if peers in individual j’s network have migratory experiences and their changed
behavior is relevant to define Pcj . As prescriptions are influenced by peers’ actions, our
framework predicts that migration can in this way change the behavior of non-migrants
indirectly. This is the case if the opinion of peers, mirrored in their actions, has enough
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weight within a social category to influence existing prescriptions.
The second channel through which migration may affect political behavior is through
learning about political processes. If migration changes the information set Ωj avail-
able to an individual j (for example by learning about democratic processes in the host
country and their value), potentially increasing the value of political participation, the
net marginal benefit of voting may increase and lead to more active political partic-
ipation. The same effect may take place through the migratory experiences of peers
that are a part of individual j’s social network, and which can contribute to enlarging
this individual’s information set Ωj, and in this way contribute to changing political
participation of individual j residing in the country of origin.
1.4 Country Context: Mozambique
This study examines migration between Mozambique, and (to a large extent) its neigh-
boring African countries such as South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania. Mozambique is
considered to be one of the poorest countries in the world with a GNI per capita of
only 1.140$PPP in 2014. Despite its high growth rates of 7.14% on average between
2000 and 2014, Mozambique is still ranked 178 out of 187 countries in the Human De-
velopment Index. For many years, Mozambique has been an aid-dependent country. In
2013, for example, the country received official development assistance of almost 15%
of its GNI (US$2.3b).10
The majority of the Mozambican population, around 78% in 2009,11 is directly de-
pendent on agriculture. Climate change is a major threat to these livelihoods as Mozam-
bique is exposed to extreme weather events that have often affected several dozens of
10World Development Indicators (2015), World Bank.
11International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database.
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thousands of people in the last two decades.12 The international donor community
generally heavily supports emergency relief and rehabilitation programs in response to
natural disasters, replacing the role of the Mozambican government to a large extent,
as the Mozambican government does not have the necessary resources for disaster relief.
This situation is particularly well documented since 2000.13
As a consequence, Mozambique has been an emigration country for a long time.
Large migratory movements from Mozambique were traditionally labor-driven mainly
from the southern Mozambican provinces to South African mines and commercial farms.
In 2013, (formal) migrant remittances flows contributed towards GDP with 1.4% with
inflows of approximately US$217 million.14 According to estimates provided by the
World Bank (2011),15 the stock of Mozambican emigrants in 2010 was 1.2 million, or
5% of the resident population.16 According to these nationally representative statistics,
the main international destinations of Mozambican current emigrants in 2010 were
South Africa, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Portugal, Swaziland, the United Kingdom,
Germany, the United States, and Spain.17
Historically, after its independence from Portugal in 1975, as a result of ten years
of war, Mozambique was led by the independence movement FRELIMO (Frente de
Libertação de Moçambique) under a single-party, socialist regime. Only two years
after independence had been negotiated, a civil war erupted between FRELIMO and
12Red Cross Mozambique (2013).
13In 2000, for example, a major flood hit the country and Mozambican President Chissano rec-
ognized in front of reporters that international aid was arriving very slowly to assist the victims of
the flooding as reported in the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre’s report in
May 2000. Information available from http://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-natural-
disasters-floods, last accessed on August 30, 2017.
14World Development Indicators (2015), World Bank.
15World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook (2011), Second Edition. Washington, DC:
World Bank. Available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/23743
16This is consistent with the large prevalence of migration evident in our survey, as illustrated by
Table 1.1.
17This is reflected in our survey data where around 87% of emigrants went to South Africa as
displayed in Table 1.2.
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RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) that created large refugee movements
to neighboring countries. With the end of the cold war, and the collapse of apartheid
in South Africa, FRELIMO and RENAMO started negotiations that resulted in a new
constitution allowing for a multi-party system, and a peace treaty signed in 1992. The
newly established peace encouraged many of the refugees to return to their homes in
Mozambique.
After the peace treaty, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 1994,
1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014. FRELIMO won all these elections by a large margin and
increased its vote share consistently. Across all national elections, electoral irregulari-
ties (mainly claimed by RENAMO, but also confirmed by international observers) had
significant consequences for the overall results. The 2009 elections, the time around
which our data has been collected, are considered to have followed international stan-
dards, despite small irregularities. Both Armando Guebuza, the Mozambican president
from 2005 until 2015, and FRELIMO were elected unambiguously by 75% in 2009.
A variety of sources considers that the quality of democracy in Mozambique is
imperfect. The V-DEM Electoral Democracy Index18 was 1.89 for Mozambique in
2009, and 3.06 for South Africa, for example - a substantial statistically significant
difference showing the potential for Mozambican migrants to South Africa to adopt
political norms that are an improvement, in this sense, to those prevalent in their
home country. Consistently with the V-DEM scores, Mozambique’s political system is
scored as 5 by the Polity IV index,19 and classified as an “open anocracy” from 2009
18The V-DEM Electoral Democracy Index measures the extent to which the rulers are “responsive
to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s approval under circumstances
when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are
clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the
chief executive of the country”. See Coppedge et al. (2016) for additional detail.
19The Polity IV index classifies levels of democracy based on an evaluation of the competitiveness
and openness of elections, the nature of political participation, and the extent of checks on executive
authority. For each year and country, a “Polity Score” is determined which ranges from -10 to +10, with
-10 to -6 corresponding to autocracies, -5 to 5 corresponding to anocracies, and 6 to 10 to democracies.
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until 2017. South Africa, in contrast, was scored as 9 and classified as a “democracy”
over the same time period. The Freedom House’s Index of Freedom in the World
currently classifies Mozambique as a “partly free country” where citizens generally show
difficulties in grasping the importance of democracy, with a score of 52/100, whereas
South Africa scores 78/100 and is considered a “free country”. Finally, the Economist
Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Democracy Index20 ranks Mozambique 115 (out of 167), and
classifies its political system as a “hybrid regime” (bordering the classification as an
“authoritarian regime”). South Africa, in comparison, ranks 41 and is classified as a
“flawed democracy” similar to the United States or Japan. Overall, these different
measures point to the quality of democracy being generally low in Mozambique, and
significantly lower than in South Africa.
Political participation is most closely related to the type of political attitudes and
behavior we measure in our paper, and proxies for the type of political norms that
Mozambican migrants may learn about while abroad and potentially transmit through
their social networks. Two different indices confirm that Mozambican emigrants may
experience improved political participation in South Africa relative to their home coun-
try. In 2009, the V-DEM Participatory Democracy Index21 for Mozambique was 1.19
and for South Africa was 2.10, a substantial statistically significant difference. We
should note, however, that this gap is lower than that observed when simply comparing
the more general V-DEM Electoral Democracy Index. The partial EUI political par-
ticipation index22 awards Mozambique 5 out of 10 points, whereas South Africa scores
20The EIU Democracy Index is constructed based on 5 pillars: electoral process and pluralism,
functioning of government, political participation, political culture and civil liberties.
21The V-DEM Participatory Democracy Index “embodies the values of direct rule and active par-
ticipation by citizens in all political processes. While participation in elections counts toward this
principle, it also emphasizes non-electoral forms of political participation, such as civil society organi-
zations and other forms of both non-electoral and electoral mechanisms of direct democracy”.
22Political participation is defined by voter turnout, autonomy and voice of minorities, participation
of women in parliament, participation in political parties and NGOs, interest or engagement in politics,
attendance of lawful demonstrations, adult literacy, interest in politics in news, and effort to promote
political participation.
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8.33 - the highest ranked country, Norway, scores 10.00. The evidence we find on the
role of international migrant networks in transmitting attitudes and behavior related
to political participation suggests that it is in this sense that emigration might be a
promoter of broader democracy at home.
1.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The household survey data used in this paper was collected in Mozambique from mid-
September until November 2009 by the CSAE at the University of Oxford. This
timeframe corresponds to the period before and immediately after national elections
took place. The data collected are nationally representative of the voting population
of Mozambique that has mobile phone coverage. The fieldwork covered four out of
the eleven provinces of the country (Cabo Delgado, Zambezia, Gaza, and Maputo-
Province), and included 161 enumeration areas and 1766 households. Both Cabo Del-
gado and Zambezia are located in the North of Mozambique, whereas Gaza and Maputo-
Province are reflective of the Southern provinces of the country. During the 2007 census
around 37 percent of the Mozambican population lived in these four provinces combined.
The sampling base we used was the 2004 electoral map of the country, and the
enumeration areas (EAs) were polling station catchment areas. Because the use of cell
phones was necessary for the construction of our behavioral political participation mea-
sure (which made use of cellphone text messages),23 we eliminated from the sampling
base all polling locations without cell phone coverage. For this purpose, we obtained
detailed data from the two cell phone operators on the geographic location of each of
their antennae. These were then plotted on a map using their geographical coordinates,
with a 5-km coverage radius drawn around each. All polling stations outside the covered
23For a detailed description of this measure, see Section 1.5.2 below.
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area were dropped from the sampling base. In 2009, 60 percent of all polling stations
in the country were covered by at least one operator.
From this sampling base, 161 polling locations were selected using two-stage clus-
tered representative sampling on provinces, then on EAs. The number of registered
voters per polling location is used as sampling weight. Since all registered voters in
the sampling frame have the same probability of being sampled, the surveyed locations
are nationally representative of the voting population of Mozambique that has mobile
phone coverage. During the baseline survey, in the event that we found no cell phone
coverage in a selected location, we replaced it by the closest polling location with cell
phone coverage. This happened in seven locations.
Sampling within each EA followed standard procedures for household representa-
tiveness: nth house call by enumerators, starting from the polling station - typically
a school located at the center of the EA. In each EA, approximately 11 households
were interviewed. Our social network measures reflect the relationships between the
household heads of each of these eleven households. Due to random sampling of house-
holds, our network measures are representative of the true, full social networks of each
household within their EA.
Interviews at baseline were directed at the household head or his/her spouse. In-
terviews were conditional on having access to a cell phone for receiving and sending
calls and messages. Respondents that did not own a cell phone but had access to one
via a neighbor or family member nearby were included in the study. In each of the
EAs, we conducted two face-to-face household surveys, one before the election, and one
immediately after.
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1.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
The importance and magnitude of international migration in Mozambique is reflected
in Table 1.1, which illustrates the percentage of households with migrants in our sam-
ple. It shows that almost 33% of all households report having at least one migrant,
and only 17.5% of households live in villages where no geographical neighbors ever mi-
grated. Approximately 41% of households have a family member living in a different
household than their own, that is currently or has been living abroad.This number in-
creases slightly to around 48% of households that indicate to be regularly chatting with
international migrant households.24
The migratory experiences in our dataset are mainly determined by emigration to
South Africa, which accounts for about 87% of all destination countries. The other
main migrant destinations are neighboring countries such as Tanzania, Zimbabwe and
Malawi.25 A detailed description of the frequency of different destination countries can
be found in Table 1.2.
24Given that the average number of individuals per household in our sample is 5.87, the 5% national
emigration rate provided by the World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook (2011) seems rather
consistent, although slightly higher, than the numbers obtained in our survey, where there were 0.21
current emigrants per surveyed household (the national emigration rate would imply 0.29 migrants
per household). This slight undercount (0.08 missing migrants per household) is understandable in
light of the method used to identify current migrants: only spouses and children of the household head
were included in our dataset. This implies that we do not include any migrants that left with their
whole families. But given that about 90% of emigration is to South Africa and that this is mostly
circular migration, our method of identifying migrants does not seem to induce large undercounts.
Moreover, because our objective in this paper is to measure the impact of emigration on domestic
politics via contact with migrants, our survey’s undercount does not seem problematic as the emigrants
underrepresented are those less likely to keep active contact with their home country.
25This distribution is consistent with information from the World Bank Migration and Remit-
tances Factbook (2011), and from census data on Mozambican emigrants for South Africa (8.6%
sample of 2011 census), Malawi (10% sample of 2008 census), Tanzania (10% sample of 2012 census),
and Portugal (5% sample of 2011 census) from IPUMS (2018). Minnesota Population Center. In-
tegrated Public Use Micro-data Series, International: Version 7.0. Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS, 2018.
https://doi.org/10.18128/D020.V7.0
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Table 1.1: Migration - Household Characteristics (%)
Number of Links Migration Experience (%)
Households with at least one migrant 32.41
Migrant households in geographical network 0 17.5
1 15.63
2 10.48
3 8.1
4 11.1
5 13.02
6 6.85
7 5.55
8 4.25
9 5.66
10 1.87
Kinship relations with migrant households 0 58.28
1 24.28
2 7.89
3 4.34
4 2.34
5 1.04
6 1.47
7 0.09
8 0.09
9 0.17
Chatting relations with migrant households 0 51.78
1 23.59
2 8.76
3 5.55
4 4.42
5 2.43
6 1.91
7 0.69
8 0.52
9 0.35
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Table 1.2: Destination Countries of All Migrants (%)
South Africa 86.62
Tanzania 5.16
Other African 1.64
Zimbabwe 1.41
Malawi 1.17
Swaziland 1.17
Other European 0.94
Portugal 0.70
Germany 0.47
Other 0.47
Cuba 0.23
Almost half of our sample is composed of women, and the average age is approxi-
mately 37 years as shown in Table 1.3. The education a respondent received is rather
limited with approximately six years of schooling on average (primary education).
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics. All Households.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Inked Finger Indicator 1112 0.29 0.45 0 1
Self-Reported Voting 1112 0.92 0.28 0 1
Learning-Corrected Self-Reported Voting 1112 0.85 0.36 0 1
Sending Text Message 1138 0.18 0.38 0 1
HH Head Female 1138 0.44 0.5 0 1
HH Head Age 1130 37.38 13.7 18 88
HH Years of Schooling 1136 5.79 4.09 0 18
Total Access to TV, Radio or Computer 1138 1.14 0.85 0 3
1.5.2 Detailed Description of Main Variables of Interest
Our main outcome variable of interest is the respondents’ actual voting during the 2009
national elections. We furthermore complement our analysis by using self-reported voter
turnout, an additional measure that corrects self-reported voting for learning about
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electoral processes, and an alternative behavioral measure reflecting the experimental
subjects’ intrinsic desire to communicate their own policy priorities.
1.5.2.1 Actual Voting Measure
To obtain a measure more closely related to actual voting behavior, as opposed to
simply limiting ourselves to analyzing self-reported voting behavior from the survey, we
followed individuals through the 2009 elections and asked them to show us the finger
that was inked after having voted. If the interviewer observed a correctly inked finger
(i.e. respondents correctly identified the finger that was inked after having voted and
the ink was still observable to the interviewer), we interpret this proxy as the respondent
having actually voted. Table 1.3 shows that almost 30% of household heads voted in
the 2009 elections as proxied by this outcome measure.26
Migrant networks might influence actual voting behavior as the contact with mi-
grants may change respondents’ political participation, namely through the combined
mechanisms proposed by our conceptual framework. They might vote in compliance
with changed political participation norms, as well as a result of having learned about
the importance of elections in democratic regimes.
1.5.2.2 Self-Reported Voting Measure
We also use a standard survey question on whether the respondent reported having
voted. Almost 91% of the respondents in our sample claimed to have voted during
the 2009 elections. The contrast with our actual voting measure suggests a strong
conformity bias where many respondents report to have voted without having done so.
26This participation rate is actually lower than 44%, which is the participation rate reported by
the Mozambican electoral authorities using official electoral data. This has probably to do with the
fact that our field team could not visit all households immediately after the election, and that the ink
could have washed out over that time interval. The lag between our visit and the election was not
systematically related to prevalence of migration, so that this underestimation of actual voting is not
likely to affect our analysis.
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Migrant networks might influence self-reported voting behavior as the contact with
migrants may change respondents’ attitudes towards political participation – although
not necessarily their actions. In particular, self-reports of voting may be higher for
migrant connected respondents since they may be better informed about the impor-
tance of political participation, and hence value it more and understand it as desirable
behavior – even if this improved information did not create a strong enough net benefit
to make our respondents actually vote.
1.5.2.3 Learning-Corrected Self-Reported Voting Measure
We furthermore make use of one more measure of self-reported voting, conditional on
the respondents not only reporting to have voted, but also being able to show the correct
finger that was inked after voting - even if the interviewers could not observe ink stains
anymore. This measure includes 85% of the respondents in our sample as shown in
Table 3. We take this measure as a proxy for information about voting procedures,
which can be understood in the context of our study. Indeed, the data collection was
conducted in rural areas where individuals live relatively close to each other in village
settings. As the ink stain will be visible on those individuals that voted for several days
(even after washing their hands), individuals that are in close contact with individuals
who voted (which is more likely to happen in migrant households) will see more inked
fingers, likely ask about the reason why this finger was inked, and hence learn about
the finger inking procedure after voting. We propose that this form of contact will lead
to increased knowledge about electoral processes, even if the individuals in our sample
had no interest in learning about voting procedures or in actually voting. Of course,
this is an imperfect measure of information about electoral processes, as it is only one
detail about voting procedures. But the fact that 85% of respondents could indicate
the right finger (significantly above the 50% one would get if answers were given at
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random), when only 29% of respondents had their finger actually inked, indicates that
this measure conveys valid information.
A positive impact of being in a migrant network on the correct finger indication
but not on our actual voting measure can thus be interpreted as evidence supportive of
migrant networks improving information about electoral processes, beyond changing the
respondent’s behavior by changing social norms. A closer connection with migrants may
act as an information transmission channel - not only about the importance of political
participation, but also about the electoral process itself. If respondents most tightly
connected with migrants, differentially self-report not only to vote more often, but are
also able to correctly show the inked finger, we can take this evidence as suggestive that
migration is acting as an information channel emphasizing not only the importance of
casting a vote (as otherwise individuals should not feel the need to misreport actual
voting behavior), but also specific details about the electoral process.
1.5.2.4 Behavioral Political Participation Measure
Finally, we also conducted a simple behavioral experiment with our survey respondents.
We proposed respondents the option to send cell phone text messages suggesting policy
priorities for the president-elect’s mandate. These suggestions would be forwarded to
an independent Mozambican newspaper that would in turn publicize these suggestions,
namely to the president-elect himself. This promise was made credible by the public
official support of the newspaper to this initiative. Note that since sending a SMS
message entails a small direct cost,27 our measure is a costly action, which we interpret
as an incentive-compatible measure of political participation.28 As shown in Table
27The cost of sending a text message is small in the sense that it is not high enough to imply
financial constraints to political participation for respondents. There is also the time cost of taking
the action itself.
28We were able to identify the individual survey respondents that sent messages through cell-number
matching. This matching was easy to achieve since participation in this study was conditional on having
access to a cellphone as discussed above.
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1.3, 18% of respondents sent SMS messages with their policy priority requests. Since
experimental subjects were invited to send policy suggestions about any policy topic of
their interest,29 we interpret an increase in the likelihood of sending a text message as
a higher desire to participate in the design of the government’s political agenda, and
thus increased intrinsic motivation for political participation.
1.5.2.5 International Migrant Networks
A household is considered an international migrant household if at least one of the
household members is currently living or has ever lived outside of Mozambique for at
least six months.30 To obtain the number of migrants an individual is connected with
through her social network, we interact this migration variable with the network links
across all households within one enumeration area.
Our migrant network variables allow us to distinguish between network effects ac-
cording to the social proximity of two survey respondents. This means that we not
only evaluate the overall number of links with migrant households in a respondent’s ge-
ographical network (i.e. within the same EA), but also, most innovatively, the number
of migrant households in an individual’s chatting and kinship network.
A chatting link is recorded if a respondent indicates to regularly talk with another
respondent.31 Note that the surveys were conducted in a rural setting and all respon-
dents live in the same village. This implies that individuals normally chat personally
with each other rather than through any intermediary platforms. We calculate kinship
29The policy priorities suggested were not linked to interventions related with government responses
to natural disasters. This further supports our argument about the exogeneity of our natural disaster
exclusion restriction.
30This definition of migrant household includes the household head: if he/she has ever lived outside
of Mozambique for at least six months, his/her household will be considered a household migrant.
31The exact phrasing of the survey question used to define a chatting link was “How frequently do
you calmly chat about the day events with the following individuals or members of their households?
Not at all, sometimes, or frequently”. We considered a link existed when the individual answered
“sometimes” or “frequently”.
29
links in the same way if some individual reports to be related to another respondent
or members of her household by family links.32 We allow for this link to be directed,
i.e. a one-sided existence of a link is sufficient, as the concept of social categories is
subjective, and does not need to be consistent across individuals.
The degree of connectedness with migrant households of a specific respondent is
calculated according to each network’s link classification as the total number of migrant
households the respondent is connected to. Table 1.1 illustrates the distribution of
network connectivity in our sample. Around 32% of all households are classified as
being a migrant household. Only 17.5% of respondents live in a village where not
a single household has a household member that is currently living or ever has lived
abroad. This number changes dramatically considering kinship and chatting networks.
Around 43% of respondents have kinship links to at least one migrant household and
approximately 48% of respondents regularly chat to migrant household members.
1.6 Empirical Strategy
To test our hypotheses, we build an econometric model based on the theoretical frame-
work described in Section 1.3. The relationship between emigration and political be-
havior is estimated for different outcome variables that reflect a respondent’s political
participation. The probability of political participation can be estimated with the fol-
lowing Linear Probability Model (LPM):
yi = α + β
∑
j 6=i
(Networkij ×migHHj) + δXi + εi (1.6.1)
where yi is an indicator variable denoting an individual’s political participation,
32A kinship link between two households exists if the following question was responded positively:
"Are the following individuals or members of their household relatives of yours, i.e. members of your
family? Yes-No”.
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and Xi represents a vector of individual and geographic characteristics determining the
likelihood of political participation. This vector includes demographic controls that
determine the identity of an individual such as gender, and age. To capture effects
arising from an enlarged information set, this vector furthermore includes the levels
of schooling completed, as well as the access to information provision (such as radio,
television, or internet access). We also control for the respondent’s own migration
history. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
The binary variable Networkij indicates whether or not individual i is has a directed
link to individual j. This variable takes value 1 if individual i reports to be connected
with individual j, independently of the link reported by individual j. This specification
is preferred to an undirected link between two individuals (where a link reported by
only one of these individuals triggers a connection between them), because we are
specifically interested in the effect of different types of migrant networks. Indeed, as
described before, we construct three types of network variables (geographical, kinship
and chatting networks), where the potential link corresponds to, respectively, the two
respondents living in the same village, having a kinship relation, and regularly chatting
with each other. Constructing social networks based on undirected links would bias our
estimates of the impact of chatting and kinship relationships towards the estimation
results on the impact of geographical networks because it would not account for the
social proximity between two households, as measured by the chatting and kinship
relationships. These relationships are particularly well captured by directed networks.
The individual j’s household is classified as a migrant household (migHHj = 1) if any
of its members ever emigrated. The sum over all j’s (not including i) of the interaction
term,
∑
j 6=i
(Networkij ×migHHj), determines the total number of migrant households
individual i is connected with, excluding her own household.33
33Our results are robust to different definitions of the social migrant network such as including
other household members’ or the respondent’s own migration experience in the network indicator.
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1.6.1 Two Stage Least Squares Estimation
1.6.1.1 Potential endogeneity of migration decisions
This paper aims at determining the impact of different types of network links with
migrants on political behavior. The main threat to identification is that individual
migration decisions may be correlated with individual political participation through
unobservable factors that cannot be controlled for using a Linear Probability Model. If
so, our network variable would capture the effect of being connected with more individ-
uals with particular political attitudes rather than the effect of being connected with
more individuals that have been exposed to a different political environment through
international migration. This would imply a correlation between our explanatory vari-
able and the regression error term. We may face an omitted variable bias if individuals
that are less (or more) politically active opt to emigrate to another country more often
than people that participate in politics more (or less) often. In the case of Mozambique,
the ongoing political instability, high corruption, and subpar working of democracy can
affect individuals in their decision to leave the country.
To tackle this issue, we use a Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation approach.34
We exploit the exogenous variation in the occurrence of natural catastrophes affecting
harvests and cattle as sources of emigration. We make use of detailed data on natural
disasters in Mozambique at the district level, allowing for large variation across EAs. In
addition, we constructed an individual-level instrument by interacting the occurrence
of droughts in the district of a respondent’s village with her birth-year.
The instrumental variable for each household takes the value of the cumulative
As a robustness check to verify whether excluding the respondent’s own migration experience as a
covariate changes our estimation results, we run all regressions without controlling for the respondent’s
own migration experience as well. Our results are robust to including covariates controlling for the
respondent’s own migration experience or migration spells of other household members.
34Our results are robust to the estimation of an IV probit model instead of the 2SLS model.
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number of droughts in the ten years prior to the respondent becoming 31 years old.35
This instrument measures the intensity of droughts around the age at which household
heads migrate, as measured in our survey. Especially in rural areas (the context of our
study), harvests and cattle are often the livelihood of families, as there are almost no
income sources from salaried work. We therefore expect the occurrence of a natural
disaster to be highly correlated with an individual’s decision to migrate in order to
provide for her family. Our instrumental variable is indeed highly correlated with
household migration as natural disasters substantially increase the pressure to emigrate
in order to provide for the family back home. The reported F-statistics (shown in Tables
4 to 6) confirm our reasoning.
In the Mozambican context, weather shocks are unlikely to be correlated with polit-
ical attitudes and behavior other than through migration. As described in the country
context section, responses to natural disasters in Mozambique are provided by the in-
ternational aid community as the Mozambican government has no resources to provide
emergency relief programs.
As a robustness check, we also used alternative drought shocks to instrument for
migrant selection. Over-identifying restriction tests displayed in column (4) of Tables 4
to 6 lend support to the exogeneity of our instruments for all outcomes of interest and
all types of migrant networks. This alternative instrumental variable for the decision to
migrate is constructed using the cumulative number of droughts in the ten years after
the respondent becomes 29 years old and prior to being 40 years old.36 We thus argue
that our exclusion restriction fulfills the two necessary and sufficient criteria to be used
as a valid instrumental variable.
35Our results are robust to the use of similar IVs constructed with different types of weather shocks
as well as different age thresholds and time spans. The weather data used are from the UNDP (2013)
DesInventar database.
36In other robustness checks, we used alternative drought shocks to instrument for migrant selection,
and additional over-identifying restriction tests also lend support to exogeneity of the instruments we
used. These results are available from the authors upon request.
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The instrumental variables we use to account for self-selection of emigrants are con-
structed in two steps: We first interact the number of droughts a neighboring household
was exposed to (in accordance with the above definitions) with our binary indicator of
whether a network link exists between our respondent and the respective household.
Second, we sum all interaction terms within the respondent’s respective enumeration
area.
We estimate the following 2SLS model:
yi = α + β
̂∑
Networkij ×migHHj + δXi + εi (1.6.2)
̂∑
Networkij ×migHHj = α + θ2
∑
Networkij ×Droughtsj + δXi + εi (1.6.3)
This specification takes the endogenous decision to migrate into account by replac-
ing the migrant network connectivity of individual i with the predicted migrant network
connectivity based on our proposed exclusion restriction. The vector Xi contains indi-
vidual and geographic controls as stated before.
1.6.1.2 Potential endogeneity of network formation
A second endogeneity concern arises from how network links are being formed. As
recognized by Manski (1993), it is possible that there is endogeneity in the forma-
tion of migrant networks in that unobserved characteristics of migrant households are
likely correlated to those of households in their networks – the well-known “reflection
problem”. In the context of our paper, if individuals are more likely to be friends
(as is captured by our chatting network measure) with households with similar polit-
ical attitudes, our explanatory variable would be correlated with the regression error
34
term. Similarly, kinship relationships might be endogenous through marriage prefer-
ences based on political attitudes and behavior.
For this reason, following the strategy proposed by Bramoullé et al. (2009), we
propose to use undirected secondary links to migrant households as an exclusion re-
striction to identify the effects of the primary directed links to migrant households on
the political outcomes we study. In the undirected network specification, we disregard
the direction of influence such that a unilaterally reported link triggers a network in-
dication for both households. More specifically, we instrument the respective network
indicator with second-degree links between households. We compute the adjacency
matrix between all households within an enumeration area and replace our original
network variable with a binary indicator equal to one if and only if, two households are
connected with each other through a third household. By construction, this variable is
highly correlated with the initial direct network variable, but is unlikely to be correlated
with individual political participation decisions as the two households do not chat with
(or marry) each other directly.37
The reported F-statistics (shown in columns (5) and (6) of Tables 5 and 6) confirm
the strength of the constructed instrument. When using alternative drought shocks
to instrument for migrant selection, over-identifying restriction tests lend support to
the exogeneity of the instrument as displayed in column (6) of Tables 5 and 6.38 Be-
cause the estimates displayed in columns (5) and (6) of Tables 5 and 6 (obtained when
accounting for self-selection into social networks) are generally larger than when this
potential endogeneity is not accounted for, we conclude that even if the second-degree
link instrument is not fully exogenous and is still at least partly driven by unobserv-
37Further, the undirected nature of the secondary network meets the identification condition of
linear independence as formally shown by Bramoullé et al. (2009).
38The over-identifying restriction tests are constructed using the cumulative number of droughts
in the ten years prior to the respondent being 29 years old, and prior to being 40 years old as an
additional instrumental variable for the decision to migrate, and second-degree network links to control
for endogenous network creation for the kinship and chatting network.
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able characteristics related to political participation, our estimates seem to be biased
downwards and thus understate the impact of migrant networks on changes in political
attitudes and behavior.
We interact the network link variable with the same instrumental variable on natural
shocks on a household (head) level as in our primary specification. We proceed by
constructing the final instrument as the sum of interactions between a binary indicator
of the existence of a second-degree link and the neighboring household’s exposure to
droughts as before. The final IV is then the sum of the total number of natural shocks
that occurred to household heads to which the respondent is connected with through
secondary links.
This is reflected in the following modification to the instrumental variable of the
2SLS model:
̂Networkij ×migHHj = α + θ2∑Second−Degree Linkij ×Droughtsj + δXi + εi
(1.6.4)
This specification takes into account both the endogenous decision to migrate, and
the endogenous creation of networks by simultaneously replacing the migrant network
connectivity of individual i with the predicted migrant network connectivity based on
our proposed exclusion restriction regarding individual migration decisions and network
formation. The vector Xi contains individual and geographic controls, as stated before.
1.7 Empirical Results
In this section, we summarize the main empirical results. We first discuss the evidence
on the relationship between geographical proximity to migrants and voting behavior.
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The subsequent subsections go further in detailing how kinship and chatting relations
with migrants may contribute to explaining the results obtained for geographical net-
works.
1.7.1 Geographical Proximity
The existing evidence on the role of international migration in shaping political attitudes
and behavior, including our own conceptual framework, proposes that a higher number
of migrants within a village should increase the political participation of others living
in the same village. Under our hypothesis that migration increases the benefits of
political participation and creates positive spillover effects, we would expect a positive
effect of geographical migrant networks on voting behavior. This positive effect would
be the result of Mozambican migrant destinations being mainly countries with a higher
democracy index, and higher political participation.39
As shown in Table 1.4a, the empirical estimates obtained are in line with our the-
oretical predictions. Column (1) of Table 1.4a shows a positive and highly significant
increase of 2.3 pp in the probability of actual voting per additional migrant household
in the village according to a simple LPM estimate. Column (2) of Table 1.4a reports
2SLS estimates accounting for the endogeneity of the migration decision of peers in
the same village, using as instrumental variable a measure of the cumulative exposure
to droughts experienced by each household when the household head was between 20
and 30 years old. Column (3) reports similar 2SLS estimates also controlling for the
respondent’s own migration history. The 2SLS estimates confirm the LPM results,
and somewhat increase the magnitude of the estimated coefficient: one more migrant
household in a village increases the likelihood to vote in that village by between 3.3
39According to the various sources described in section 1.4, and despite the fact that the better
political norms at destination being generally considered imperfect.
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pp and 3.4 pp. As an additional robustness check, we furthermore report results for
2SLS estimates with two instrumental variables in Column (4), where the second in-
strumental variable is a measure of the cumulative exposure to droughts experienced
by each household when the household head was between 30 and 40 years old. The
estimated impact of one more migrant household in a village further increases to a 4.1
pp rise in the voting probability. Overall these empirical results support the prediction
of our conceptual framework and past findings in the literature that migrant geographic
networks promote political participation.
The magnitude of this positive result decreases when analyzing the impact on self-
reported voting behavior, particularly under the LPM specification as shown in column
(1) of Table 1.4b where this coefficient becomes close to zero. All the 2SLS estimates
in columns (2) - (4) of Table 1.4b confirm the effects found for the actual voting mea-
sure, with a significant estimated impact of an increase between 1.6 and 1.9 pp in the
probability of self-reporting to vote in presence of an additional migrant in the village.
Consistent with the existing literature, households in villages with more migrants,
are found to be more politically active, although migrants seem to have a smaller effect
on self-reported than actual voting. This difference can be explained by the conformity
bias and resulting over-reporting of voting behavior discussed above, which may reflect
an increased perception of the value of political participation because of information
conveyed by migrants, as discussed in the previous sections.
We estimate a significantly stronger impact of geographical networks on the learning-
corrected measure than on the simple self-report measure, as is clear in Table 1.4c. In
all the estimated specifications, the impact of migrant networks is positive, significant
and higher than when simply considering self-reported voting. We interpret this ev-
idence as providing further support for an important informational role of migration
through geographical networks. Indeed, migrants seem to transmit information about
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the relevance of political participation and about the political process itself. This is
consistent with migrant-connected respondents being significantly more likely to self-
report voting, and also to show the correct inked finger – a display of better knowledge
about the electoral process, in addition to the simple recognition of the importance of
voting. This result is consistent with the evidence outlined in Section 1.4 that access to
news about politics in Mozambique is limited. As a result, households contacting with
migrants abroad might benefit from the additional information that migrants obtained
abroad and transmit back to their networks in the home country.
Another potential theoretical mechanism that can explain the impact of migrant
networks on political participation is a change in the social norms of migrant villages,
which generates intrinsic motivation for political participation. If this is the case, we
would expect that experimental subjects connected to migrants respond more strongly
when given the possibility to express their policy priorities – even if this is not part of
the standard political process of the country. As international migration from Mozam-
bique is mainly to South Africa that has much higher political participation rates, the
transmission of increased political participation social norms is likely to be a valid mech-
anism in our setting. Indeed, our behavioral measure of political engagement confirms
this hypothesis, although only after accounting for the potential simultaneity bias of
migration networks and political behavior. Although the effect of geographical migrant
networks is not statistically significant and almost zero when using a LPM as shown
in column (1) of Table 1.4d, the 2SLS estimates in columns (2) - (4) of Table 1.4d
show that one more migrant household in a village increases political participation of
its residents by between 3.9 pp and 5.3 pp.
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Table 1.4: Effects of International Migrant Geographical Network
(a) Actual Voting dependent variable.
LPM 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
International Migrants within Locality 0.023*** 0.034** 0.033** 0.041**
(0.007) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017)
Own Migration Experience Control yes no yes yes
Individual Controls Included yes yes yes yes
Instrumental Variables - A A A + B
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-Statistic - 34.66 33.29 19.10
Hansen J-Test p-value - - - 0.30
Observations 1102 1102 1102 1071
(b) Self-Reported Voting dependent variable.
LPM 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
International Migrants within Locality 0.004 0.016** 0.019** 0.016**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Own Migration Experience Control yes no yes yes
Individual Controls Included yes yes yes yes
Instrumental Variables - A A A + B
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-Statistic - 34.66 33.29 19.10
Hansen J-Test p-value - - - 0.33
Observations 1102 1102 1102 1071
(c) Learning-Corrected Self-Reported Voting dependent variable.
LPM 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
International Migrants within Locality 0.011*** 0.028** 0.029** 0.029**
(0.004) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
Own Migration Experience Control yes no yes yes
Individual Controls Included yes yes yes yes
Instrumental Variables - A A A + B
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-Statistic - 34.66 33.29 19.10
Hansen J-Test p-value - - - 0.96
Observations 1102 1102 1102 1071
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Table 1.4: Effects of International Migrant Geographical Network.
(d) Behavioral Measure dependent variable.
LPM 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
International Migrants within Locality -0.001 0.039** 0.046** 0.053***
(0.008) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019)
Own Migration Experience Control yes no yes yes
Individual Controls Included yes yes yes yes
Instrumental Variables - A A A + B
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-Statistic - 33.59 31.44 18.54
Hansen J-Test p-value - - - 0.55
Observations 1128 1128 1128 1097
Table Notes: Individual Controls include gender of household head (male), age of household head (years), highest
education level completed by the household head, and access to radio, television and computers. We further control
for province effects in all specifications. Instrumental Variable A in columns (2) – (3) is a measure of the cumulative
exposure to droughts experienced by each household when the household head was between 20 and 30 years old. Column
(4) reports results with two instrumental variables where the additional IV B is a measure of the cumulative exposure
to droughts experienced by each household when the household head was between 30 and 40 years old. Please see text
for details on the construction of the IV. Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistics and p-values of Hansen J-Test are reported
where applicable. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the enumeration area level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
The difference between the LPM and 2SLS estimates across all outcomes we use
suggests negative self-selection of migrants in terms of their political attitudes. This
is consistent with the results of Batista et al. (2017), which uses a number of sources
of variation and estimation strategies to conclude that emigration from Mozambique
seems to be driven by unobservable negative self-selection – in terms of entrepreneurship
in that case. This is consistent with a context in which there is a long history of migra-
tion to South-African mines and farms, where large networks of migrants substantially
decrease any pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of migration.
Overall our estimates suggest that geographical migrant networks are likely to im-
prove political participation in migrant countries of origin through both information
and intrinsic motivation mechanisms.40 One important question that remains is to
40A relevant caveat to our empirical results is that we cannot distinguish the changes in political
41
understand what type of personal relationship with the migrant drives the impact of
migrant geographical networks on political participation. For this purpose, we look at
two types of networks within the geographical network: chatting and kinship networks.
1.7.2 Chatting Networks
We are interested in understanding how friendship – and in particular friendship with
international migrant households – may affect political behavior. Friendship is a com-
plex concept and implies subjective definitions especially in a country context such as
Mozambique, where there exist many local languages whose usage in rural areas domi-
nates the official language Portuguese. We proxy friendship by asking respondents with
whom in the sampled village households they regularly chat, as described in detail in
the previous section.
Chatting with migrant households seems to significantly increase actual voting be-
havior. Columns (1) to (4) of Table 1.5a show a marginally significant positive impact
of migrant chatting networks on political participation. These effects become larger
and more precisely estimated when accounting for self-selection into migrant chatting
networks. As shown in columns (5) to (6) of Table 1.5a, chatting with one more migrant
household has a positive and significant effect on actual voting behavior of between 6.5
pp and 7.6 pp when controlling for migrant self-selection and endogenous friendship
selection. Table 1.5b shows the effect of regularly speaking with migrant households
on an individual’s likelihood to self-report having voted. As before, we obtain highly
significant positive effects of up to 3.9 pp in the probability to self-report voting per
additional migrant household in the chatting network. This estimate is robust to con-
trolling for self-selection of migrants and endogenous network formation.
participation arising because of international migration per se, from potential income effects generated
by migrant international remittances because the value of these remittances received is not included
in our dataset.
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This effect is much higher when examining the impact on the learning-corrected
self-reported voting measure, as shown in Table 1.5c. We interpret this evidence as
supportive of an important role of chatting with migrants for the transmission of in-
formation on the importance of political participation, and on the political process
itself.
The estimation results displayed in Table 1.5d show that the effect of migrant chat-
ting networks is also positive and significant on our behavioral measure of political par-
ticipation after controlling for simultaneity biases. As reported in column (3) of Table
1.5d, the positive effect of talking to one more migrant household increases the likeli-
hood of sending a text message by 2.6 pp when accounting for migrant self-selection,
and by 2.9 pp when additionally controlling for the respondent’s own migration history.
Accounting for endogenous network formation, the likelihood of sending a text message
increases to between 5.4 pp and 5.9 pp as shown in columns (5) and (6). This evi-
dence supports that chatting with migrant households can act as an important driver
of prescribed social norms on political participation.
1.7.3 Kinship Networks
We now turn to examining the role of kinship relations with migrant households in
shaping political behavior of the left behind. A kinship relation between two households
exists, if a respondent indicated to have family ties to the household head or any other
member of another household in our sample within the respective EA. Since households
were randomly sampled within each EA, we can expect the observed network links with
migrants to be representative in magnitude to the overall kinship connectedness with
migrant households of the respondent.
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Our results in columns (1) to (4) of Table 1.6a suggest that kinship relations with
migrant households are positively correlated with actual voter turnout. Our estimates
point to a 1.1pp to 3.2pp effect, which cannot however be precisely estimated. Ad-
ditionally controlling for the endogenous formation of network links in column (5) of
Table 1.6a increases the effect of migrant networks to an imprecisely estimated effect
between 4.1 pp and 5.7 pp. This seems to indicate that family ties to migrants are not
the main driver of the strong impact of geographical networks on actual voting behavior
we reported in Table 1.4a.
In terms of self-reported voting, kinship ties to migrants significantly increase self-
reported voting behavior up to 5.4 pp even after controlling for unobservable self-
selection in migration decisions and endogenous network formation, as is shown in
columns (1) - (6) of Table 1.6b. This result does not seem very reliable however since
the exogeneity of the secondary network instrument we use to account for endogenous
network formation is rejected by the over-identifying-restriction test for the self-reported
voting outcome. While exogeneity of this instrumental variable is rejected, the estima-
tion bias seems to underestimate the true effects of migrant networks, so that we expect
the true effect to be larger than our (likely biased) estimates.
This effect is stronger when correcting the self-reports for knowledge about the
voting process, particularly when accounting for self-selection into kinship networks: as
is displayed in columns (1) – (6) of Table 1.6c, the impact of migrant kinship networks
varies between 2.8 pp using the LPM model, and 7.6 pp using the 2SLS estimates. This
evidence supports that having a migrant in the family can importantly contribute to
better information on both the importance of political participation, and the political
process itself – even if it is not enough to bring these family members of migrants to
actually vote.
In contrast to the results on self-reported voting, our behavioral measure of polit-
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ical participation is not significantly affected by kinship ties with migrant households.
Neither the LPM, nor the 2SLS specifications yield any statistically significant esti-
mation results, although the point estimates are consistently positive. These results
suggest that being family related to migrants may not be enough to cause significant
changes in prescribed social norms, and hence on the intrinsic motivation for political
participation.
1.7.4 Discussion of Results
The impacts we estimate are quantitatively substantial, particularly given the high
prevalence of migration in Mozambique, as illustrated in Table 1.1. Indeed, taking 4.3
as the mean value of household migrants per village with migrants, living in a village
with migrant households is responsible for an increase of 14.2 pp in the probability of
actual voting in that village, and an increase of 19.8 pp in the probability of sending a
text message with policy priorities to the president.
Again, in our sample the mean effect of regularly chatting with migrant households
is an increase of 12.3 pp in the probability of actual voting, and an increase of 11.1 pp
in the probability of sending the policy-demand text message. These effects are sizable,
particularly in the context of an election that had a national turnout rate of 44% -
implying that the effect of migrant networks would be between 28% and 32% of the
overall turnout.
1.8 Concluding Remarks
There is a large body of literature in the social sciences examining the relationship
between international emigration and politics in the home country of migrants. Our
paper contributes to this by examining the diffusion of political norms and informa-
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tion about electoral processes through different types of migrant networks – which we
measure using detailed data on geographical networks, kinship networks and chatting
networks.
Two mechanisms are likely to promote political participation through migrant net-
works: enlarging the information set of individuals in the home country, and changing
their social norms governing political participation. Both of these mechanisms are
likely to promote political participation provided the migrants transmit information
and norms that are superior to those prevalent in their country of origin.
The choice of studying migration as a determinant of political participation in the
context of the 2009 national elections of Mozambique is particularly relevant in this
context. Mozambique is a low-income country with substantial South-South emigration,
almost exclusively to other neighboring sub-Saharan African countries. This is a setting
where both migrant countries of origin and destination are flawed democracies, and
where the empirical question of whether migrants can transfer improved political norms
back home is not trivial – while being of great relevance in a world where most migration
flows happen in similar contexts.
Our empirical results suggest that political attitudes and behavior can be learned
and valued more highly at home by individuals who are in contact with emigrants.
We furthermore find that increased political participation seems to be mainly driven
through contact with migrants through regular chatting, rather than through family
links to migrants. The evidence we examine is consistent with both information trans-
mission and changed social norms for political participation via chatting with migrants.
Family links seem to convey some information about the political process, but do not
seem to significantly affect broad political engagement.
Related to our findings, existing evidence establishes that there are several mech-
anisms via which migration may affect the strengthening of democratic institutions.
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Adida and Girod (2010), Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow (2010) and Pfutze (2012), for
example, emphasize the role of emigration in simultaneously improving governance and
promoting political participation. Our results corroborate their findings.
While we confirm existing results on the positive effects of international emigra-
tion on political participation, the lack of heterogeneity in destination of Mozambican
emigrants does not allow us to test for differential effects of migration to destinations
with higher and lower democratic scores according to international rankings such as
V-DEM or EIU, unlike Batista and Vicente (2011) for the case of Cape Verde. It will
be important to produce additional research on this type of heterogeneous effects in
countries with South-South migration flows to a variety of destinations.
In this paper, we use different measures of political participation - namely a proxy for
actual electoral voting, and a behavioral measure based on a text message experiment
that asked respondents to send a message with policy priorities to the president. The
use of these very different measures provides credibility to our findings on the impact of
emigration on political participation. Our findings are however more limited in terms
of empirically distinguishing the mechanisms through which migrant networks affect
political participation. Our proxies for improved electoral information and for changed
political participation social norms/increased intrinsic motivation for political partici-
pation can only provide suggestive evidence of how different migrant networks transmit
political participation. Further research using richer measures of electoral information
and political norms would be of great academic interest and policy relevance.
Overall, our work suggests that migration policies whereby the best governed migra-
tion host countries open their doors to migrants from countries with poor accountabil-
ity records might be an effective way to promote political participation in the migrant
countries of origin. According to our findings, these host countries need not be the
most developed and with highest democratic rankings. Enacting South-South ‘brain
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circulation’ policies such as scholarship schemes not only in developed countries, but
also in destination countries where governance is flawed and democracy is far from
working perfectly, might be an effective tool to promote the strengthening of political
institutions and ultimately economic development.
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Chapter 2
Keeping Up with the Joneses:
Ranking Effects on Effort,
Cooperation, and Firm Performance
2.1 Introduction
Around 75% of the total employed in Sub-Saharan Africa are self-employed1 - most
of them operating petty businesses with low profit margins and low survival rates.
Households depend on incomes generated by these firms as there are few salaried jobs
available. However, few of these businesses evolve over time or contribute to growth in
the formal economy. Understanding what holds these businesses back is a key challenge
in development economics. The most common policies supporting micro-firm growth
focus on two input types. They provide access to financial capital2 or increase human
1World Development Indicators. Source: International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database.
Data retrieved in September 2018. The indicator of status of employed in this dataset distinguishes
between wage and salaried workers, and self-employed workers. The share of self-employed workers in
Mozambique is even higher with 84% despite high GDP growth rates in the past.
2Financial capital is provided in different forms such as access to micro-credit, (un-)conditional
cash grants, and access to savings means. Blattman et al. (2014) and McKenzie (2017) find large
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capital through business skills training. This paper investigates an alternative approach:
Increasing firm performance by changing a firm owner’s beliefs about the returns to
effort and cooperation with their business network.
The effects of changing beliefs, and as a consequence effort and cooperative behavior,
on firm performance are potentially large for two reasons. First, effort might be a crucial
input factor, so far understudied in the micro-firm literature.3 In firms with only one
worker (the owner), effort in terms of work hours is the extensive margin of labor
input. Micro-firm owners may be more elastic in the effort they supply rather than
employment. Second, business cooperation between firm owners and their business
network can be beneficial through two channels.4 Increasing cooperation with their
business network can improve business practices as individuals learn from their peers,
and cooperation can increase firm outcomes by fostering stronger business partnerships.
Stronger firm relations can, for example, reduce transportation cost of products by
pooling orders from wholesale merchants.
To investigate whether perceptions of relative performance standing affect effort and
cooperation choices, and how they relate to firm performance, I conducted a randomized
control trial in the Maputo metropolitan region in Mozambique. I implemented two
randomized interventions. The main intervention provides firm owners with information
about their relative sales ranking. Each individual in the treatment group received a
ranked list of ten anonymous vendors, including themselves, that was representative
increases in earnings from relaxing credit constraints by providing conditional cash grants. Batista
et al. (2017) similarly find positive effects on firm revenue from providing entrepreneurs with access to
savings means.
3There is a large literature in personnel economics identifying the relationship between effort and
performance, how to incentivize effort of employees through contract structures, and the effect of such
incentives on employee wellbeing.
4Cooperative behavior is defined in its broadest sense including cooperative activities such as
colluding on prices, sharing business advice, and informal finance such as loans. Higher cooperation
increases a firm owner’s social capital that has positive returns as shown in Blattman et al. (2016)
or Fafchamps et al. (2018). The effects of cooperation might be negative as a high degree of income
sharing norms might be disadvantageous (Jakiela and Ozier (2016)).
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of the full distribution of vendors in their sector. It displayed each vendor’s weekly
sales at baseline and their relative position. The subject’s own name and position
were highlighted. Half of the treatment group, additionally to observing their rank,
received information about peer characteristics. This information included peer gender
and age. This second treatment allows me to isolate the impact of peer characteristics
on behavioral changes.
A firm owner’s effort choice is sub-optimal with respect to profit maximization if
the perceived returns to effort are lower than the real returns to effort. The ranking
contains information relevant to effort optimization if it provides firm owners with new
information about the highest levels of revenues attainable in their sectors. If individuals
calculate the return to effort based on their expectation of future revenues, information
about peer revenues allows them to update their beliefs and optimal effort decisions. As
peer revenues are not observable and there is little information about possible revenue
levels, the ranking can be expected to contain a large amount of information for low-
performing individuals. Individuals in the bottom of the distribution receive a negative
signal provoking them to change their effort level as they change their beliefs about the
returns to effort but also if they care about their relative standing itself.5 Similarly,
an individual might process the information the ranking revealed to reevaluate her
business network cooperation. After receiving a negative signal and observing that a
higher level of revenues is very likely to be possible, an individual might strategically
increase cooperation to benefit from a better firm network.
5The change in effort might be positive if firm owners become encouraged to work more to increase
their sales. Firm owners might also become discouraged and work less or even close their stores. The
theoretical predictions in the tournament literature suggest that both, subjects at the very bottom
and at the top, decrease their effort after observing their relative standing. The effect of performance
feedback is expected to be positive in non-competitive environments for the whole distribution of
subjects. In this setting it is unclear whether the business environments resembles more closely a
tournament setting or a non-competitive setting as there are many clients and firms. The empirical
results of this paper suggest that market clusters mainly composed of micro-firms are less competitive
than they appear.
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There are three main reasons why effects from the additional treatment might differ
and why observing the top seller’s gender might matter. First, experimental evidence
finds women to be less likely to self-select into competition which could imply larger
pro-social preferences.6 Individuals observing a female top seller might change their
pro-social preferences reflecting her behavior. Second, a female top seller might provide
an additional signal about the attainability of higher sales. Low-performing women see
a role model that encourages them to aspire more. Third, the social status of women in
many developing countries is low. Women are considered to be less capable and have
less agency. Individuals observing a female at the top might understand her success as
more feasible to attain for themselves.
I use three main data sources to measure impact: surveys, lab-in-the-field data, and
actual sales data. The study follows 315 micro-firm owners7 over one and a half years.
The survey team visited each firm four times, the first time to collect baseline data
to be used in elaborating the performance ranking and to check for sample balance.
Then, two months after the baseline for the intervention and to present the rankings.
Finally, firms were visited four months and one year after the intervention to measure
the impact of the ranking. The survey data contains information about firm owners’
socio-economic background, effort allocation, business practices, and firm outcomes.
At baseline and four months after the intervention, firm owners also played a set of
incentivized games eliciting risk and pro-social preferences. Cooperation is proxied by
pro-social preferences, including how much an individual cares about, shares income,
and helps members of her social network. I measure pro-social preferences by contri-
butions in an incentivized dictator game. I asked individuals to indicate the person
6See Niederle and Vesterlund (2007).
7Firms were already established and are representative of the population of micro-firm owners in
Maputo. Per week, firms earned less than US$70 on average in profits which represents less than US$2
per day in per capita income. Hence, improving the productivity of these firms is not only a priority of
the Mozambican government to stimulate the private sector but also to increase incomes of the urban
population.
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they talk with the most about their own or the other person’s business. Individuals
then decided how much of their endowment to share with this person. At the end-line
survey, I additionally collected monitored sales data of each firm over an entire day to
check for the reliability of survey-reported sales data.
I estimate differential average treatment effects for high- and low-performing firms.
Low-performing firms are defined as those whose weekly sales at baseline are below
the 50th percentile. High-performers include all other firms - those with an average
sales performance and above. This definition allows me to distinguish treatment effects
between a clearly negative and a positive ranking signal.
There are three main findings from my experiment. First, being exposed to the
ranking increases effort of low-performing individuals. I measure effort as the amount
of hours an individual works at her firm. Treated low-performing firm owners work
more hours than low-performing firm owners in the control group. They work as many
hours after the intervention as high-performers in the control group. The effect remains
statistically significant one year after the intervention. For high-performing individu-
als the impact of learning about their ranking is negative. They report a small but
significant decrease in effort compared to high-performers in the control group.
Second, the ranking changes cooperation of low-performing individuals. Treated
low-performers share more than low-performers in the control group. I interpret this
effect as a positive impact of exposure to the ranking on firm cooperation. The treat-
ment effect on high-performers is small and not statistically different from zero.
Third, and most importantly, changes in effort and cooperation are associated with
changes in firm performance among low-performing firm owners. I report treatment
effects on sales and profits over the last two days, and on self-reported profits in the
previous month. At baseline low-performing individuals increase both their sales and
profits over both time periods. Sales of low-performers more than double compared to
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low-performers in the control group. Self-reported profits of low-performers are 54%
higher than in the control group. The increase in firm performance closes the income
gap between treated individuals in the bottom of the distribution at baseline, and high-
performers in the control group by 48%. High-performing individuals, however, are not
affected by the ranking. Their firm outcomes remain unchanged.
A mediation analysis suggests that both effort and cooperation are relevant in-
puts that are strongly associated with the positive impact of the treatment on low-
performers. However, it is unclear whether the gender composition of social networks
matters. I estimate the additional effect of gender information on the ranking effect.
Specifically, I analyze the impact of providing information that the top seller in a group
is a woman. My results show that the impact of the ranking is strongest for those
that also receive information about peer characteristics. The additional effect of ob-
serving a female top seller is not significantly different from zero in terms of effort and
cooperation choices but it is large and statistically significant for firm outcomes. Low-
performers at baseline that observed a female top seller increase their reported sales
and last month’s profits relative to low-performers in the control group. This effect is
90% higher than the effect from receiving the ranking alone. This suggests that observ-
ing peer characteristics contains relevant information changing firm outcomes through
additional channels other than effort and cooperation.
The biggest identification threat to this study is the reliability of self-reported sales
and profit data. Motivational lying has minimal costs as we cannot confirm self-reports
about past periods. To diminish the risk of misreports a team different from the team
of enumerators conducting the surveys distributed the ranking. We provided informa-
tion about the individual’s relative position only once such that misreporting will not
increase positions in future rankings. Nevertheless, misreporting at one of the follow-up
visits could potentially be worthwhile if the individual cares about the researcher’s opin-
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ion. To check the validity of effects on self-reported sales, we tracked sales of individuals
over one entire business day. Low-performing individuals increase their observed sales
one year after the intervention. The impact of the ranking on these monitored sales is
robust regarding both effect size and precision of the estimates. Low-performers in the
treatment group more than doubled sales compared to low-performers in the control
group.
This study provides experimental evidence on the effect of changes in micro-firm
owners’ beliefs about returns to work effort and cooperation on actual behavior, and
of ranking information on firm performance. It addresses several gaps in the literature
on the constraints to micro-firm development. One gap in this literature is the absence
of evidence on individual effort as a production input in micro-firms. Most evalua-
tions focus on business skills training or access to financial capital. The returns to
traditional skills training are small (McKenzie and Woodruff (2013)). Although firms
adopt improved business practices in the short run, they are often dropped over time.
Impacts on profits or sales, as a consequence, are small and can often not be precisely
estimated. Trainings focusing on simple financial heuristics however do increase firm
outcomes (Drexler et al. (2014), Batista et al. (2017)). Further, access to formal savings
accounts increases productive investments (Dupas and Robinson (2013)), and business
grants transform male-run enterprises when combined with skills training (Berge et al.
(2017); de Mel et al. (2014)).8 But it is unclear whether micro-firm owners optimize
over their effort allocation given their skills and capital.
This paper also relates to a growing literature that focuses on the impact of mentor-
ing and consulting on firm performance. Management consulting increases total factor
productivity of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the long run in Mexico (Bruhn
et al. (2018)). Lafortune et al. (2018) find that a consulting intervention in Chile in-
8Further examples on the impact of financial capital on firm outcomes include Blattman et al.
(2014); Dupas and Robinson (2013); Fafchamps et al. (2014).
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creases household income. The latter is less cost-effective though than a role model
intervention. Mentorship by experienced entrepreneurs increases profits of micro-firms
in Kenya by 20 percent (Brooks et al. (2018)). Recent experimental studies that es-
timate the impact of business networks find comparable results. Monthly meetings
of business associations increase revenue - especially for those firms with better peers
(Cai and Szeidl (2018)). The effects are driven by increased knowledge sharing and
newly-created business partnerships. This paper contributes to this literature by esti-
mating the returns to pro-social behavior. I provide evidence that pro-social behavior
positively correlates with firm performance at baseline. My experimental results show
that pro-social behavior is changeable through a small nudge and that this increase in
cooperation also correlates with changes in firm performance.
Last, this paper relates to the literature on relative performance feedback. There is
a large evidence base on how relative feedback changes effort-based performance among
students and workers. The size and direction of effects depend on the setting, incen-
tive scheme, and prospects of feedback provision. Azmat and Iriberri (2010) provide
students with information on how their GPA compares to the average. This informa-
tion increases later grades by 5%. Eriksson et al. (2009) find that relative performance
feedback decreases worker performance. Relative performance feedback increases per-
formance under individual incentive schemes, but deteriorates performance under a
tournament scheme (Hannan et al. (2008)). Feedback in the lab increases performance
only when performance is related to pay (Azmat and Iriberri (2016)). Kuhnen and Ty-
mula (2012) find that the prospect of receiving a ranking increases effort. These studies
focus on workers or students, and few provide experimental field evidence. This paper
contributes to this literature by presenting field experimental evidence for firms. It
furthermore analyzes the impact of peer characteristic observability on ranking effects.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents further
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information on the experimental design, and a conceptual framework displaying through
which channels the treatment might affect firm outcomes. The data and sampling
framework are described in detail in Section 2.3. The estimation strategy is presented
in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 discusses the experimental results, and Section 2.6 presents
robustness checks on self-reported sales data. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Background
With perfect information about peer performance, showing individuals their ranking
should not have any effects. In market clusters in developing countries, however, peer
performance is likely to be unobservable. The majority of individuals in the sample had
inaccurate beliefs about their relative position. Only 24% of low-performers accurately
state that they are doing worse than the average firm in the market they operate in.
Around 8% of low-performers actually believe they are doing better than the average.
High-performers have similarly incorrect beliefs about their relative position. Only 18%
of high-performers accurately believe that they are performing better than the average.
On the contrary, 17% of high-performers believe that they perform worse than the
average. The strong majority of individuals believe that their firms are doing equally
well as the average firm in their market.
Further, the gender of peers should not matter if it does not contain additional
information about the attainability of higher revenues and better business practices. As
background, I describe the experimental design and then characterize the relationship
between ranking information and firm performance in a simple conceptual framework.
Using insights from baseline data I identify the likely effect on firm outcomes of changes
in effort and cooperation.
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2.2.1 Experimental Design
This study was conducted with established micro-firms in urban market clusters of the
greater Maputo region. Between August and September 2016, we collected baseline
data from 624 firm owners. For those individuals that reported revenues over the week
prior to the baseline interview I constructed individual rankings. The rankings were
based on each individual’s sector of firm activity. I then determined the decile in which
each individual falls at baseline. A few firms were dropped from the sample as there
were less than ten firms vending similar products in our sample. Figure 2.2.1 displays
an example of an individual’s ranking.
Figure 2.2.1: Example of Ranking Sheet.
Notes: This figure depicts an example of a ranking sheet individuals in the first treat-
ment group observed. Their own name was highlighted whereas peers are displayed
anonymously. Shown is the relative position as well as the revenues of one week. Rev-
enue data was collected during a baseline survey two months prior to the intervention
visit.
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A ranking consists of ten firms. It includes the individual’s firm as well as one
firm per other decile. The other firms shown are those with the median sales in their
respective decile. This means that all individuals in the same sector observe the same
peers. Choosing the median firm controls for outliers. Firm owners are anonymous
and the individual’s own position is clearly highlighted with her name and a colored
bar. Additional to their relative position, individuals observe other’s revenues as well as
their own over the same period. As sector sizes are unequal, reporting ten representative
firms ensures that all other features of the ranking are held constant. The ranking was
distributed to 192 (out of a total experimental sample of 323) individuals between
November and December 2016. There was minimal framing on how an individual
could improve her ranking. Individuals did not keep their ranking sheet and there was
no indication that they would be ranked again. Half of the treatment group could
additionally observe peer characteristics (see Figure 2.2.2 for an example).
For each firm, treated individuals observed whether their respective peers are male
or female and their age. Information on age is included to make the observability
of gender as a research interest less salient. Treatment assignment was stratified by
gender. Randomization was done on the individual level.
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Figure 2.2.2: Example of Ranking Sheet with Observable Peer Characteristics.
Notes: This figure depicts an example of a ranking sheet individuals in the second
treatment group observed. Their own name was highlighted whereas peers are dis-
played anonymously. Shown is the relative position as well as the revenues of one week.
Revenue data was collected during a baseline survey two months prior to the interven-
tion visit. Additionally to the revenue data, individuals can observe a peer’s gender
and age.
2.2.2 Should a Ranking Change Entrepreneurial Behavior and
Firm Performance?
The intervention was designed to affect firm performance through two main interme-
diary outcomes: effort and cooperation. I propose an individual decision model, where
subscript i represents a micro-firm. A micro-firm has only one worker - the firm owner.
The production function thus becomes an individual problem. An entrepreneur’s in-
come depends on three input factors. Her individual skills, Si, which may include school
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education as well as practical knowledge on how to run a business. It depends on the fi-
nancial capital the individual invests, ki, that includes investments in the firm structure
as well as inventory. Third, income depends on the effort level, ei. This framework is
analog to a production function where output is a function of capital and labor inputs,
and a firm’s technology. Assume that the income of the individual, yi, is a function of
these inputs of the following form:
yi = Sif (ki) g (ei) (2.2.1)
Both capital and effort enter the production function indirectly. Figure 2.2.3 dis-
plays the quadratic relationship between hours worked and firm performance at baseline.
Figure 2.2.3: Relationship Between Effort and Firm Performance.
Notes: This figure plots the quadratic relationship between effort and firm revenue at
baseline for around 600 micro-firms. Both hours worked and revenue data are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentile. Sales are reported in the Mozambican local currency,
Meticais.
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Regression estimates for the baseline sample of approximately 600 micro-firms sug-
gest that one additional hour worked increases sales by almost 30%.
The key part of this model is an individual’s effort choice. At baseline, an indi-
vidual’s effort choice depends on the individual’s expected return to effort. Assume
that there are no outside options (off-firm work) and that an individual chooses be-
tween leisure time and hours worked in the firm. The household income and the firm
production function become thus interdependent.9 The optimization problem of the in-
dividual is determined as a classical division problem between labor and leisure subject
to a budget constraint. The wage rate for in-firm work is a function of the individual’s
skills, and the output and input prices of the firm. Given that market fluctuations
and general economic conditions affect both input and output prices, the wage rate for
in-firm work is uncertain. We can summarize the relationship between effort and firm
income at baseline as follows:
ei = g1 (EΩi [yi]) (2.2.2)
Equation 2.2.2 defines the effort choice of individual, i, as a function of her expected
income. The parameter Ωi determines the information set about future incomes avail-
able to individual i. The information set is heterogenous across individuals and might
depend on factors such as education, self-confidence, or risk aversion.
There are two main reasons why an individual’s perception about others’ incomes
should affect her effort. First, information about the success of peers might change
expectations about future income. Many entrepreneurs in developing countries become
self-employed as there are little salaried employment opportunities. As a consequence,
being an entrepreneur is often associated with low incomes and has a negative reputa-
tion. Receiving information about the income levels of colleagues allows individual, i,
9See Lopez (1984) for a full model exemplary of the agricultural sector in Canada.
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to update her beliefs about attainable income levels. This in turn affects effort. This
effect should be strongest for low-performing individuals as there is little additional in-
formation for individuals at the top. This is similar to Cullen and Perez-Truglia (2018)
that estimate an employee’s effort level as a function of own salary and perception
about peer salaries. When provided with information about the average salary of their
boss, workers increase effort to increase the likelihood of future higher salaries. The
ranking affects the information set, Ωi, as it provides additional information on possible
revenue levels.
Furthermore, there is a long-standing literature in economics and social psychology
on the effects of peer incomes on happiness and utility. The Easterlin paradox (Easterlin
(1974), Easterlin (1995)) illustrates that average happiness has remained constant over
time while per capita GDP increased. The general consensus attributes the effect to
the importance of relative income considerations in the utility function (Clark et al.
(2008)). Social comparison models10 predict that perceptions of peer income shape
intrinsic motivation. This means that individuals derive utility from improving their
income level relative to their peers. As income depends on effort, information about
peer income affects effort levels. We can model the individual’s effort choice with
information about peer income as
ei = g1 (EΩi [yi]) + g2 (y−ig) (2.2.3)
where y−ig denotes incomes of peer −i in sector g. For individuals that care about
their relative position by itself, providing information about their ranking changes effort.
The effect is different for low-performing and high-performing individuals. Furthermore,
10Social comparison theory was first developed by social psychologist Leon Festinger (1954). It states
that individuals compare themselves to others to determine their own worth. Comparing ourselves
with others serves as a way of self-motivation. In its initial definition comparison works as a benchmark
to make evaluations of oneself. By comparing ourselves to a more successful peer, we might be driven
to achieve more and improve our abilities.
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it is unclear a priori whether the effect is positive or negative. Low-performers increase
their effort to increase their future income and achieve a higher status. On the other
hand, they might become discouraged and decrease effort. High-Performer might in-
crease their effort to maintain their top status or slack off as they have already achieved
an outstanding position.
The second relevant factor for the production function that might change firm out-
comes is cooperation within business networks. Firm-to-firm interactions have impli-
cations for firm performance through supply chain networks (Acemoglu et al. (2012)),
access to credit (McMillan and Woodruff (1999)), and the diffusion of information and
business practices (Cai and Szeidl (2018), Fafchamps and Quinn (2018)). The general
consensus of this literature is that stronger business networks benefit firm outcomes.
Increasing cooperation with one’s business network increases firm outputs through re-
duced input prices, facilitates access to capital, ki, and increases the skills set, Si. On
the other hand, cooperation that leads to social pressure to share income decreases firm
outcomes by affecting investment decisions (Jakiela and Ozier (2016), Squires (2018)).
The non-causal relationship between cooperation11 and firm performance for the base-
line sample is depicted in Figure 2.2.4. Firm revenues increase in cooperation with
diminishing returns. Regression estimates for the baseline sample suggest that one
additional token shared increases sales by around 10%.
11Cooperation is measured as contributions in a dictator game where the counterpart is the in-
dividual’s business partner. Decisions were incentivized and payouts made on the same day for the
“dictator” and during the following day for the counterpart. A detailed description of the game and
measure can be found in Section 2.3.2.2.
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Figure 2.2.4: Relationship Between Cooperation and Firm Performance.
Notes: This figure plots the quadratic relationship between cooperation and firm rev-
enue at baseline for around 600 micro-firms. Revenue data is winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentile. Sales are reported in the Mozambican local currency, Meticais.
Respondents could share any amount between 0 and 20 with the recipient in an in-
centivized dictator game. Units reported are the number of tokens shared where each
token is worth 20MZN for recipients and 10MZN for dictators.
The ranking might affect cooperation in two ways: Individuals intensify their coop-
eration with their business partner to further exploit the benefits of business networks
as described in the literature. This includes access to credit through private loans,
support with supply chain management, and sharing information about better busi-
ness practices. Further, individuals might decrease their contributions to their business
networks if they change their perceptions about their social obligations to share. In-
dividuals that are ranked lower than what they initially expected to be ranked, might
become more self-centered and feel less obliged to share income. The gender of the top
seller is of relevance if female top sellers have different cooperation norms than male
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top sellers. Individuals that can observe the top seller’s gender might change their
own cooperation behavior to copy these different cooperation norms and imitate firm
success. A detailed description of the difference between male and female top sellers
can be found in Section 2.3.5.
2.3 Data and Sampling Strategy
This study took place in the Maputo metropolitan region in Mozambique. Mozambique
is a country in East Africa with an abundance of natural resources but a private sector
whose development is lacking behind. The country experienced conflict and social
unrest since the independence war with Portugal started in 1964. The independence
war ended in 1975 but was followed by 15 years of civil war between the two major
political parties. Recent resurrections of civil conflict and natural disasters threatening
the livelihoods of the rural population caused increased migratory flows to urban areas.
Salaried work opportunities are scarce and many workers resort to self-employment.
Most of the self-employed are organized in local market clusters. The sample drawn
for this study focuses on micro-firms in these markets. In this section, I describe the
sampling strategy and data sources, as well as relevant characteristics of the sample
and randomization balance checks.
2.3.1 Sample Selection
There is limited administrative information available in Mozambique about the size and
structure of existing markets. To verify the representativeness of our sample for the full
population of firms in the Maputo metropolitan region, we conducted a census survey.
The census survey was guided by an administrative list with information which market
clusters existed and estimates of the total number of firms in the respective market.
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We conducted census interviews in 76% of the markets that were located either in
the city of Maputo or Matola, and had at least 100 firms. We excluded two informal
markets whose structures implied a security risk to our enumerator teams. We collected
census data for 3.136 firms in 33 markets. The census data includes information about
the firm responsible’s age, gender, nationality, and basic literacy. We collected firm-
specific information on the firm’s sector, prospects of remaining active in the market,
and specific location instructions.
The baseline survey was conducted with 624 firm owners and managers that were
randomly selected from a subset of firms that met our exclusion criteria. The exclusion
criteria were critical for a field experiment described in detail in a companion paper
(Batista and Seither (2018)). Excluded are firm owners older than 50 years, with a
business operation horizon of less than a year, and foreigners. Additionally, we ex-
cluded all fruit/vegetable sellers, gastronomy firms, illegal sales activities, traditional
medicine, and wholesale merchants. For this study, I further excluded firms that did
not provide revenue data during the baseline or that operated in sectors with less than
ten competitors. We were able to locate 316 firm owners again during the intervention
visit. These firms build the sample of this study.
2.3.2 Data
We tracked micro-firms for approximately one and a half years from the census. During
this time, we conducted three in-person surveys: shortly after the census survey (base-
line survey), four months after the intervention to measure short-term impacts (Survey
2), and one year after the intervention (Survey 3). The ranking was shown in a separate
intervention visit two months after the baseline survey visit.
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2.3.2.1 Survey Data
All surveys were conducted with the primary responsible of the respective firm. This
was either the owner herself or the manager in case the shop was rented. Managers
have full decision power and receive either all profits or a large share. They have
thus self-interests in maximizing profits similar to firm owners. We did not interview
employees. In the baseline survey, we collected information on individual and household
characteristics of the firm responsible, firm characteristics, business practices, and firm
performance indicators. The module on firm characteristics includes information about
individual time allocation such as hours and days worked. During Survey 2 we collected
information on all time-variant measures included in the baseline survey. The survey
was completed by 94% of the sample. Survey 3 is a shorter version of Survey 2 focusing
on measures on firm characteristics and firm performance, and was administered to 85%
of the sample.
I use the baseline survey to check for balance between the control and treatment
group, and to rank firms. The ranking is based on a firm’s sales during the week prior
to the interview. The data was collected step-wise. Enumerators asked respondents to
indicate their primary products. For each product, enumerators then asked about the
total value of sales for the respective product yesterday, the day before yesterday, etc.
for a full week. We collected data for five primary products and the total rest of sold
goods.
To estimate the effect of the ranking on firm performance indicators other than
revenues, I also calculate firm profits. Similar to collecting sales data for the week
prior to the interview, we collected information on five main expenditures categories.
We obtained information about each day of the preceding week regarding personal
and product-related transport cost, the cost of purchasing new products and materials,
employee salaries, and operational cost (including market taxes). We also collected
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data about any additional expenditures for a respective day. These concern almost
exclusively cost for meals during the day and the usage of bathrooms. To calculate
profits, I sum all main expenditures (excluding other cost) and subtract them from the
indicated sales. In Survey 2 and Survey 3 we collected additional profit data by asking
individuals how much money they had left over after paying for all expenses in the last
month.12
The main concern about self-reported sales and profit data is measurement bias due
to recalling error. The further away a sales day the more complicated for an individual
to remember the exact sales value. To reduce this risk, I focus on sales and profit data
for the last two days prior to the interview only. I further verify my results with real
sales data that we collected as described in Section 2.6.1.
2.3.2.2 Lab-in-the-Field Data
During the baseline survey and Survey 2 we collected information on risk and pro-social
preferences. To elicit risk preferences, we asked individuals to take an incentivized deci-
sion between investing in a lottery and a safe amount. Individuals received 1.000MZN
(around US$15) as endowment without any framing what the money should be used
for. They were then asked to decide how much of this value they wanted to invest in
a risky lottery that would double the investment with a 50% probability. With 50%
probability they would loose half of the investment. Investments could only be made
in 100MZN steps. The win was to be paid out within one day.
We also measured pro-social preferences by eliciting modified dictator game deci-
sions.13 During the baseline survey and Survey 2, individuals were asked to indicate
12Individuals that were unsure about the exact amount were asked to indicate an interval. I use
the midpoint value of the interval for observations where the exact value is missing.
13In total, individuals took 32 dictator decisions. The full set of dictator game decisions is to be
exploited in a companion paper. Only one of the games was paid out. Which game was determined
by a random draw of the individual at the time of data collection. The order of all dictator games was
randomized.
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the person they speak most with about their own or the other’s business. The choice
was restricted to a business person living in the Maputo metropolitan region. Choosing
an actual business partner rather than playing with an anonymous counterpart was
crucial to identify changes in cooperation with a business network on firm performance.
We collected basic information about the relationship between our respondents and the
recipients, and contact details of the recipients. The decision was implemented for the
dictator (our respondent) on the same day and until the end of the next day for the
recipient.14
We offered individuals 200MZN (US$3). The decision making process was illustrated
with tokens and a decision board where tokens had to be distributed between oneself
and the recipient. Each token was worth 10MZN (US$0.15). Individuals were then
asked to decide whether they wanted to give all, parts, or none of the 200MZN to their
colleague. The value allocated to the recipient was doubled (each token was worth
US$0.30) whereas the dictator received the simple monetary value of tokens in her box
(each token was worth US$0.15).15 Due to the data collection cost of this measure, we
only elicited pro-social preferences at baseline and during Survey 2.
14Asking respondents to indicate business partners often implied that recipients were part of the
experimental sample. Whenever this was the case, recipients were asked to make their decisions first
before receiving any payouts from other respondents. This implied that some recipients were paid later
than one day after the decision was made.
15Changing the price of giving was first proposed by Andreoni and Miller (2002). In the present
study, only social preferences elicited through modified dictator games with a lower price of giving
are a significant predictor of entrepreneurial success. I am interested in the impact of a treatment on
changes of pro-social preferences and cooperation, and as a consequence firm revenues. Why different
modifications of the baseline game yield different relationships between pro-social preferences and firm
outcomes is an open question for future research. One explanation seems to be that the standard
dictator game is driven by social norms rather than actual pro-social preferences as described in List
(2007).
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2.3.3 Descriptive Statistics and Randomization Balance
The average age of micro-firm owners in the sample is 34 years, and 41% of them are
women. On average, they have about 8 years of schooling and only 10% ever received
any formal training in their sector. Our participants live in households with 5.9 house-
hold members and spend around 7,351MZN each month for household expenditures.
They own around nine household assets. They operate their firms for a little less than
eight years (including periods in which the firm was temporarily closed). In their firms,
they own assets with a market value of approximately 11,797MZN. On average, over
two days they generate revenues of 3,546MZN or 1,483MZN in profits. The average
firm owner works a little less than 10 hours a day for 6 days per week. Respondents in
our sample shared 44MZN (22% of the endowment) with the recipient16 and invested
a little more than half of their endowment in the risky lottery.
Table 2.1 reports the main randomization check using baseline survey data. Treat-
ment was randomized individually stratified by gender. The treatment group includes
all individuals that have received ranking information (independent of whether they
have received additional information on peer characteristics). The first set of mea-
sures checks for balance along select covariates related to individual characteristics of
firm owners. The second set of measures checks for balance of the key outcome mea-
sures at baseline. Treatment and control are imbalanced in only one of the 15 baseline
characteristics (household size). Information on the number of individuals living in a
household was collected in Survey 2 but not Survey 3. Additional robustness checks in-
cluding household size as a covariate in the short-term analysis do not alter my results.
All empirical results regarding pooled regressions are thus robust to excluding the one
randomization strata with imbalance.
16The majority of existing studies finds that individuals share around 20% of their endowment with
their peers.
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2.3.4 Who Are the Low-Performers?
To understand what distinguishes low-performers from their more successful peers at
baseline I present differences in their key characteristics in Table 2.2. Low-Performers
are defined as individuals whose firm performance at baseline falls into the bottom of
the distribution. Specifically, I define the cut-off at the 50th percentile. Firms below
the 50th percentile receive a clear signal that they perform worse than the average firm.
I compare these individuals to all other individuals - including those with median and
above performance at baseline.
Respondents in our sample are of similar age, with low-performers being slightly
younger (though not statistically significantly). There are more women in the bottom
of the distribution than men but there is no difference in household size. Low-performers
have the same amount of years of education and probability of having received formal
business training compared to their peers. Firms in the bottom of the distribution are
significantly younger. They exist for around 6.4 years whereas their peers opened firms
8.6 years before our baseline survey visit. This indicates that although individuals with
low-performing firms have the same level of formal education they have 2 years less
business experience. The lack of business experience could proxy for low-performers
having worse firm networks and business practices, misjudging the return to capital
and effort, or having a smaller client base of regular customers.17
There is no difference between low-performers and their peers in risk preferences
or the likelihood of having invested in their firm during the last six months. Low-
performers exert significantly less effort and share slightly less with their business net-
17In a separate regression I estimate the non-causal relationships between years of business experi-
ence and several key outcomes that might be relevant for firm performance (available upon request).
There is no statistically significant or economically relevant relationship between business experience
and bookkeeping or the calculation of business measures. I find weak evidence that business experience
leads to better inventory management and lower risk aversion. Kremer et al. (2013) provide detailed
evidence on the impact of improved inventory management and investments.
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Table 2.2: Difference Between Bottom and Top Vendors for Select Covariates.
Bottom Median & Top t-test
N mean se N mean se difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (10)
Baseline
covariate
Age 107 33.07 (0.94) 206 33.99 (0.60) -0.92
Female 107 0.46 (0.05) 208 0.39 (0.03) 0.07
Years of
schooling
107 8.08 (0.29) 208 8.03 (0.20) 0.05
Formal business
training
107 0.09 (0.03) 208 0.11 (0.02) -0.01
Household size 107 5.89 (0.26) 208 5.88 (0.18) 0.01
Years in
business
107 6.44 (0.68) 209 8.60 (0.47) -2.16***
Risk preferences 106 5.22 (0.37) 207 5.37 (0.25) -0.15
Investment
(past 6 months)
78 0.50 (0.06) 138 0.52 (0.04) -0.02
Hours worked
/day
106 9.45 (0.15) 206 9.88 (0.11) -0.43**
Dictator game
contribution
107 4.15 (0.31) 211 4.589 (0.23) -0.44
Sales last two
days
101 948.00 (91.11) 184 4971.79 (474.24) -4023.79***
Profit last two
days
99 22.85 (245.09) 181 2282.43 (469.54) -2259.58***
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for firms in the bottom of the distribution and the
median and top. The bottom group includes all subjects that fall below the 50th percentile.
Reported is a selection of covariates. Sales, profits, and hours and days worked are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentile. The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means
across the groups. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.
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work. This causes them to earn 80% less in revenues compared to their peers. The
difference in profits is even more striking. The reported results suggest that changes in
effort and business experience are likely to explain a large proportion of any observed
changes in firm performance.
2.3.5 Are Female Entrepreneurs Different?
If the gender of peers is observable it is not clear a priori what traits individuals can
potentially copy from women that excel in their firm sector. To gain some insights in
what way women differ, I illustrate key characteristics of female and male top sellers in
Table 2.3. Due to the small sample of top sellers most differences although large in size
are not significantly different from each other. Male top sellers are 7.5 years younger
than female but they operate their firms for the same amount of time. This suggests
that men start their successful businesses earlier rather than women taking more time
in achieving similar success. Whereas both men and women have the same amount of
years of formal schooling, 14% of men have formal business training compared to 8%
of women. Households of top men are slightly larger in size.
Around 67% of women and 70% of men have invested in their firm during the last six
months. Men invest around 100MZN (US$1.50) more in the risky lottery than women.
There is almost no difference in effort between men and women at the top with the
average top seller working close to ten hours a day. Men share a little less than 20% of
their endowment, and women share 28% of their endowment (the sample average is 22%
as described above). This difference is not statistically different from zero. Although
men report higher revenues than woman there is almost no difference in profits of male
and female top sellers.
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Table 2.3: Difference Between Male and Female Top Vendors for Select Covariates.
Male Female t-test
N mean se N mean se difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (10)
Baseline
covariate
Age 14 29.71 (2.39) 13 37.23 (2.25) -7.52**
Years of
schooling
14 7.71 (0.69) 13 8.00 (0.58) -0.29
Formal business
training
14 0.14 (0.10) 13 0.08 (0.08) 0.07
Household size 14 6.43 (0.76) 13 5.54 (0.74) 0.89
Years in
business
14 9.43 (1.94) 13 9.46 (2.10) -0.03
Risk preferences 14 6.36 (1.04) 12 5.33 (1.33) 1.02
Investment
(past 6 months)
10 0.70 (0.15) 6 0.67 (0.21) 0.03
Hours worked
/day
14 9.93 (0.40) 13 10.00 (0.59) -0.07
Dictator game
contribution
14 3.86 (0.65) 12 5.67 (1.02) -1.81
Sales last two
days
13 15802.31 (3476.58) 12 11580.00 (2940.15) 4222.31
Profit last two
days
13 7803.69 (3495.21) 12 7714.83 (2657.61) 88.86
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for female and male top sellers. Top sellers are
those whose firm performance lies above the 90th percentile of their sector-specific distribution.
Reported is a selection of covariates. Sales, profits, and hours and days worked are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentile. The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means
across the groups. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.
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2.4 Estimation Strategy
The theoretical framework in Section 2.2.2 predicts that the effects from relative perfor-
mance feedback can be both positive and negative. The sign of the overall effect is thus
an empirical question. I exploit the availability of pre- and post-intervention data to
estimate a difference-in-differences model. Randomization was done at the individual
level stratified by gender. As gender might be a relevant factor for firm performance and
the effectiveness of the ranking, stratification improves the precision of my estimates
(see Duflo et al. (2008) or Bruhn and McKenzie (2009)). To estimate the causal impact
of the ranking on outcomes, I estimate Average Treatment Effects (ATE). Note that
the ATE is equal to the Treatment-on-the-Treated Effect (TTE) as only individuals
that could be found at the time of the intervention visit are included in the sample.18
There is thus full compliance.
Let Treati be an indicator for assignment to treatment equal to 1 if individual i
has seen her ranking and 0 otherwise. Positivei denotes a binary variable that is equal
to 1 if an entrepreneur is in or above the 50th percentile, and 0 otherwise. Post is a
binary indicator that equals 0 for pre-intervention data and 1 otherwise. I control for
survey round effects and the randomization strata, own gender, to improve efficiency.
Outcomeit is a measure for individual i of her effort, cooperation, and firm performance
indicators. I pool all data where two post-intervention periods are available. For those
outcomes where only one post-period of data is available this is clarified in the respective
table.19 The standard errors, εi, are clustered at the level of the randomization unit,
18Individuals that were not in the markets but were interviewed at baseline had either closed their
firms, were traveling, or did not consent to participate in the study. Even if those individuals were
identified again at a later point they are excluded from this study sample. Nevertheless, results are
robust to including the full sample and can be obtained upon request.
19Additional estimates for both four-months and one-year analyses are similar in size to the pooled
estimates and over time. Estimates for the one-year only impact are generally less precise, as expected,
given the loss in power for a smaller sample. The lack of precision in estimating one-year effects of self-
reported firm revenues is compensated by precise estimates of treatment impacts on observed revenue
data.
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the individual. I estimate the following equation:
Outcomei = αi + δ1Treati ++δ3Positivei + δ4 (Treati × Positivei) + δ2Post
+ β1(Treati × Post)+ β2 (Positivei × Post)+ β3 (Treati × Positivei × Post)
+ γ1Genderi + γ2SurveyRound+ εi (2.4.1)
The interaction term Treati × Positivei identifies the differential treatment effect
for individuals that received a positive signal as their performance was at the median
level or above. β3 is the additional effect of receiving positive feedback for those indi-
viduals that received the treatment. The impact of the ranking on high-performers is
determined by the sum of β1 and β3. Linear hypotheses tests are reported in all tables
below the respective coefficients of interest. β1 identifies the ATE of the ranking on low-
performing individuals under the identifying assumption of random assignment. The
reported estimates compare the difference in outcomes of treated entrepreneurs pre-
and post-intervention to the changes in outcomes of the counterfactual with the same
position in the distribution at baseline. In other words, β1 is the impact of the ranking
on low-performers compared to low-performers that did not observe their relative po-
sition. Whereas, β1 + β3 is the impact of the ranking on high-performers compared to
high-performers that did not observe their ranking. To determine the relative change of
the treatment group compared to the control, I report the control mean for each group
post-intervention separately.
I estimate the impact of peer characteristic observability as an additional effect
over the ranking impact alone. PeerInfoi is an indicator for assignment to treatment
equal to 1 if individual i observed peer characteristics. TopGenderi controls for the
effect of operating in a sector where individual i would have a observed a woman if
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peer characteristics were observable. The interaction term PeerInfoi × TopGenderi
is the additional effect of observing a woman at the top for those that observed peer
characteristics. As before, the econometric specification includes survey round and
randomization strata fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
I restrict the sample to individuals that are not top sellers (excluding the last percentile)
to avoid potentially confounding effects due to multicollinearity between the individual’s
own gender and the indicator for TopGenderi for those individuals that are top sellers.
The full model is specified as follows:
Outcomei = αi + δ1Treati ++δ3Positivei + δ4 (Treati × Positivei)
+ µ1PeerInfoi ++µ2TopGenderi + µ3 (PeerInfoi × TopGenderi) + δ2Post
+ β1(Treati × Post)+ β2 (Positivei × Post)+ β3 (Treati × Positivei × Post)
+η1 (PeerInfoi × Post)+η2 (TopGenderi × Post)+η3 (PeerInfoi × TopGenderi × Post)
+ γ1Genderi + γ2SurveyRound+ εi (2.4.2)
The interpretation of β coefficients is as above. The main interest of this specifi-
cation is the estimation of the effect when individual i observes that the top seller is
a woman. The joint effect of η1 and η3 determines the additional effect of observing
a top woman on the treatment effect of rankings. As before, I estimate joint effects
for low- and high-performers separately. The p-values of the linear hypotheses tests of
joint significance are reported in the respective column of each outcome in the relevant
tables.
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2.5 Results
In this section, I present the empirical results in two steps. First, I analyze the impact
of observing one’s ranking on effort and cooperation. I then present evidence how the
behavioral changes translate into changes in firm performance by discussing the impact
of rankings on three firm output measures. In Section 2.5.2 I discuss results on the
impact of gender observability.
2.5.1 Impact of Firm Rankings
Tables 2.4 - 2.6 present estimation results of the differential treatment effect of learning
about one’s rank. All outcomes on effort and firm outputs are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentile to control for potential outliers. I report multiple measures of effort and
firm performance in Tables 2.4 and 2.6. For these outcome families, I report Romano-
Wolf adjusted q-values to correct for multiple hypotheses testing (Romano and Wolf
(2005)). For each outcome I report the means for low- and high-performers in the
control group separately. I also provide p-values of linear hypothesis tests of a joint
effect of observing the ranking and receiving a positive signal.
2.5.1.1 Impact on Individual Effort
I begin my analysis by estimating the impact of observing one’s ranking on personal
effort choice. We can think of effort in two ways: productivity of hours worked (intensive
margin) and the quantity of labor and work hours supplied (extensive margin). The
available data allows me to estimate the impact of the treatment on the extensive
margin of effort by measuring how many hours per day and how many days in a regular
week an individual personally takes care of her shop. Panel A of Table 2.4 contains
ATE estimates on outcomes for the pooled sample. Table A.2 in Appendix A contains
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dynamic treatment effects on outcomes. Standard errors clustered at the level of the
individual are reported in parenthesis next to each estimate. Romano-Wolf adjusted
q-values for each estimate are reported in brackets. All regressions are difference-in-
differences regressions where only the ATE estimates are reported. Survey and strata
fixed effects are included in all regressions.
The impact of the ranking treatment on effort choices of low-performers is large
and significant. Low-performers work 0.862 (s.e. 0.346) hours more per day than low-
performers in the control group (mean = 9.27 hours). This corresponds to a 9% increase
in labor supply. Importantly, treated individuals initially performing worse than their
peers exert almost as much effort after the intervention as do high-performers in the
control group. Low-performers also increase the number of days worked during a normal
week by 0.4 days (s.e. 0.16). This increase leads to low-performers working as many
days as high-performers in the control group after observing their ranking. These
estimates are robust to correcting for multiple hypotheses testing.
Appendix Table A.2 provides corresponding ATE estimates after four months in
Panel B and one year in Panel C. Effects are very similar in size and significance to
the pooled sample estimates. After four months, low-performers increase their effort
by 0.87 (0.34) hours per day. After one year, low-performers in the treatment group
still exert higher effort by working 0.842 (s.e. 0.47) hours more than the control group.
At both time periods this means that nudging higher effort through providing ranking
information closes the effort gap between treated low-performers and high-performers in
the control group. The treatment impact on effort is confirmed for Panel C estimating
the impact of the treatment on days worked in the shop. The ATE estimate is not
statistically significant in the short-run. This is likely due to the fact that there is little
variation in days worked between low- and high-performers in the control group after
four months to begin with.
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The ranking has a negative impact on high-performers. The ATE coefficient on
hours worked is negative and statistically significant. The p-value of the joint signifi-
cance test (0.02) suggests that providing individuals with information that their firm is
doing relatively well decreases their effort by 0.51 hours. Treated high-performers still
exert higher effort than the average low-performer in the control group. The dynamic
treatment effects confirm this result. We do not observe statistically significant effects
of the treatment on high-performers for the amount of days they work per week.
The ranking is thus successful in increasing the effort level of low-performers without
impairing high-performers as the effect on them is small or zero. The positive effect on
low-performers is consistent over time. This suggests that individuals that were once
nudged into higher effort levels correctly update their beliefs on the return to effort and
maintain a higher effort level.
2.5.1.2 Impact on Pro-Social Behavior
Table 2.5 presents estimates of the effects of rankings on cooperation. The degree to
which individuals cooperate with their business networks is proxied by eliciting pro-
social preferences through dictator games. Individuals took decisions with respect to
one specific person (one link) of their business network. I interpret effects on pro-social
preferences with this one person as representative for changes in cooperative behavior
with the individual’s entire business network. We collected data on dictator game
contributions at baseline and during Survey 2 (after four months). The reported results
are thus ATE estimates for the short run only. As before, the preferred specification
is a difference-in-differences regression model. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level and reported in parentheses, Romano-Wolf q-values are reported in
brackets next to them.
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Table 2.5: Ranking Impact on Cooperation.
Difference-in-difference
Standard dictator game
ATE se
Outcome (1) (2)
Short-term impact
Ranking 2.460*** (0.817)
Positive Signal 2.113*** (0.779)
Ranking × Positive Signal -1.991* (1.066)
Control mean - bottom 2.839
Control mean - top 4.549
Joint test - p-value 0.1723
adjusted r-squared 0.012
Observations (cluster) 598 (313)
Notes: All coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates.
All regressions include randomization strata fixed effects.
Baseline differences and time trend effects are controlled for
in all regressions though not reported. Standard errors clus-
tered at the individual level. * significant at 10%; ** signifi-
cant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Cooperation is measured in units of tokens shared with the recipient. The endow-
ment was 20 tokens that had a monetary value of approximately US$3. The ranking has
no impact on the cooperative behavior of high-performing individuals. Although the
additional effect of receiving a positive signal on the impact of the ranking is negative
and statistically significant at the 10% level, the joint effect is not distinguishable from
zero. Further, the negative effect is smaller in size than the large positive of the ranking
itself.
The ATE estimate of the treatment for low-performers is positive and highly sig-
nificant. Low-performers almost double the number of tokens shared compared to
low-performers in the control group. This effect is statistically significant at the 1%
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level. Treated individuals increase the amount of tokens they share by 2.46 units over
a base level of 2.84 units in the control group of low-performers. Four months after the
intervention, treated low-performers share even more than high-performers in the con-
trol group (mean = 4.55). These results suggest that ranking information encourages
low-performers to increase their cooperation with their business network rather than
becoming more selfish and decreasing their cooperation.
2.5.1.3 Impact on Firm Performance
The conceptual framework in Section 2.2.2 suggests that increases in effort and cooper-
ation lead to increases in firm outcomes. I estimate treatment effects on firm outcomes
for a family of three different firm performance indicators: sales over the last two days,
researcher-calculated profits over the last two days, and self-reported profits over the
last month. All three outcomes are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. The ATE
estimates for sales, profits, and self-reported profits are displayed in Columns (1), (4),
and (7) respectively of Table 2.6. Clustered standard errors are reported in parenthe-
ses and adjusted q-values in brackets next to each estimate. Effects are measured in
changes in the Metical value (Mozambique’s currency) for the pooled sample in Panel
A.
The ranking has no effect on firm outcomes of high-performing individuals. The
results in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show that the ranking does not change high-performers’
cooperative behavior and has only a small impacts on their effort choice. Firm out-
comes of high-performers that received information about their relative position are
thus similar to those of high-performers in the control group.
Changes in the behavior of low-performers, however, translate into changes in firm
outcomes. Low-performers in the control group increase their sales by 1,623MZN (sig-
nificant at the 5% level). They more than double their sales compared to their peers
89
Ta
bl
e
2.
6:
R
an
ki
ng
Im
pa
ct
on
Fi
rm
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
-w
in
so
riz
ed
ou
tc
om
es
.
D
iff
er
en
ce
-in
-d
iff
er
en
ce
re
gr
es
sio
n
O
LS
re
gr
es
sio
n
Sa
le
s
Pr
ofi
t
Se
lf-
re
po
rt
ed
pr
ofi
t
AT
E
se
q-
va
lu
e
AT
E
se
q-
va
lu
e
AT
E
se
q-
va
lu
e
O
ut
co
m
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
Pa
ne
lA
:P
oo
led
Sa
m
pl
e
R
an
ki
ng
1,
62
3.
60
6*
*
(7
38
.8
83
)
[0
.0
59
4]
1,
39
7.
21
4*
(7
56
.2
98
)
[0
.0
69
3]
1,
25
5.
83
6*
*
(5
74
.8
17
)
[0
.0
59
4]
Po
sit
iv
e
Si
gn
al
-1
,2
06
.3
81
(9
76
.2
71
)
[0
.2
97
0]
-4
34
.8
76
(9
98
.3
86
)
[0
.6
83
2]
2,
59
9.
74
5*
**
(5
49
.1
78
)
[0
.0
00
0]
R
an
ki
ng
×
Po
sit
iv
e
-2
,1
75
.3
18
(1
,3
33
.2
57
)
[0
.2
17
8]
-1
,4
62
.3
01
(1
,3
48
.7
97
)
[0
.2
97
0]
-1
,2
41
.8
47
(8
43
.0
98
)
[0
.2
97
0]
C
on
tr
ol
m
ea
n
-
bo
tt
om
1,
39
5.
58
6
34
5.
70
7
2,
33
0.
00
0
C
on
tr
ol
m
ea
n
-
to
p
3,
76
4.
67
8
1,
73
3.
03
4
4,
90
2.
72
6
Jo
in
t
te
st
-
p-
va
lu
e
0.
62
14
0.
95
37
0.
98
22
ad
ju
st
ed
r-
sq
ua
re
d
0.
04
9
0.
01
3
0.
02
6
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
(c
lu
st
er
)
81
5
(3
14
)
81
0
(3
14
)
53
5
(3
02
)
N
ot
es
:
O
ut
co
m
e
m
ea
su
re
s
ar
e
w
in
so
riz
ed
at
th
e
1s
t
an
d
99
th
pe
rc
en
til
e.
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
in
C
ol
um
ns
(1
)
an
d
(4
)
ar
e
di
ffe
re
nc
e-
in
-d
iff
er
en
ce
s
es
tim
at
es
.
Ba
se
lin
e
di
ffe
re
nc
es
an
d
tim
e
tr
en
d
eff
ec
ts
ar
e
co
nt
ro
lle
d
fo
r
in
al
lr
eg
re
ss
io
ns
th
ou
gh
no
t
re
po
rt
ed
.
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
in
C
ol
um
n
(7
)
ar
e
O
LS
es
tim
at
es
as
ba
se
lin
e
da
ta
on
se
lf-
re
po
rt
ed
pr
ofi
ts
is
no
t
av
ai
la
bl
e.
A
ll
re
gr
es
sio
ns
in
cl
ud
e
ra
nd
om
iz
at
io
n
st
ra
ta
an
d
su
rv
ey
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
in
di
vi
du
al
le
ve
la
re
re
po
rt
ed
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
R
om
an
o-
W
ol
fa
dj
us
te
d
q-
va
lu
es
co
rr
ec
tin
g
fo
r
m
ul
tip
le
hy
po
th
es
es
te
st
in
g
fo
r
th
e
fa
m
ily
of
ou
tc
om
es
sh
ow
n
in
th
is
ta
bl
e
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
*
sig
ni
fic
an
ta
t1
0%
;*
*
sig
ni
fic
an
ta
t
5%
;*
**
sig
ni
fic
an
t
at
1%
.
90
(the mean of low-performers in the control group is 1,395MZN). The treatment thus
causes low-performers to close the performance gap to high-performers by almost 43%.
Low-performers also catch up in terms of calculated profits. The increase in profits
equalizes the difference in profits between treated low-performers and high-performers
in the control group.
Column (7) in Table 2.6 displays the treatment impact on self-reported profits. We
asked respondents in our sample how much money they had left over after paying for
all expenses in the last month. This data is available for both post-treatment surveys
but not for the baseline survey. The reported results are OLS estimates of the pooled
sample. The results are strikingly similar to results on sales. Low-performers increase
their monthly profits by 54% compared to the control group. This effect is statistically
significant at the 5% level. By increasing their profit, firms close the gap to high-
performers in the control group by 48%.
These results are robust to multiple hypotheses testing. In summary, the ranking-
induced changes in behavior translate into improvements in firm outcomes. Given the
very large impact on firm outcomes, it is unlikely that changes in effort and cooper-
ation alone fully explain the changes in firm performance. Other factors affected by
the ranking not measured in this study might further contribute to the increase in
firm outcomes. Nevertheless, these results show that low-performing micro-firms are
not optimizing their effort and cooperation choices. Further, providing information
about their relative position nudges firm owners into optimal behavior without fur-
ther instructions on how to close the performance gap. But what motivates behavioral
changes?
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2.5.2 Does it Matter If the Top Seller is a Woman?
To gain further insights on why information about one’s relative position matters, I
exploit exogenous variation across the observability of peer characteristics. I varied
whether an individual receives her ranking only (Figure 2.2.1) or if she additionally
observes the gender and age of peers (Figure 2.2.2). In this section, I am particularly
interested in the impact of observing a woman at the top. Female top sellers exert a
similar amount of effort as their male peers as shown in Table 2.3. Any impact on
changes in effort from observing a female top seller should thus be driven by changes in
expectations about attainable incomes rather than the imitation of business practices.
Tables 2.7 - 2.9 display estimation results for treatment effects of the ranking and
gender observability combined. The samples are restricted to firms below the 90th
percentile. I estimate the joint effects of observing a female top seller and receiving
information about one’s relative position as before for low- and high-performers sepa-
rately.
2.5.2.1 Effort and Cooperation Optimization
Table 2.7 reports results for effort choices measured in hours and days worked. The
first row displays the effect of the ranking after controlling for the impact of peer
characteristics in the reduced sample pooling over all periods. The treatment effect
of the ranking itself is robust and statistically significant at the 5% level for both
effort measures. It is similar in size and robust to controlling for multiple hypotheses
testing. To evaluate the impact of a female top seller, we are interested in the joint test
of the linear hypothesis that the ranking coefficient, the peer info coefficient, and the
interaction term between peer info and gender of the top seller is statistically significant.
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Table 2.7: Ranking and Peer Info Impact on Effort - winsorized outcomes.
Difference-in-difference regression
Hours worked Days worked
ATE se q-value ATE se q-value
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Pooled Sample
Ranking 0.850** (0.405) [0.0495] 0.416** (0.192) [0.0495]
Positive Signal 0.547 (0.357) [0.0594] 0.502* (0.261) [0.0594]
Ranking × Positive -1.099** (0.442) [0.0099] -0.394 (0.315) [0.1386]
Peer Info -0.043 (0.252) [0.8713] -0.032 (0.204) [0.9703]
Top Gender -0.316 (0.334) [0.4752] -0.019 (0.255) [0.4752]
Peer Info × Top Gender 0.454 (0.469) [0.7228] 0.178 (0.430) [0.7228]
Control mean - bottom 9.309 5.982
Control mean - top 9.870 6.171
Joint test bottom - p-value 0.0097 0.1469
Joint test top - p-value 0.7239 0.7433
adjusted r-squared 0.065 0.010
Observations (cluster) 687 (251) 685 (251)
Notes: Outcome measures are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All coefficients are
difference-in-differences estimates. All regressions include randomization strata and survey
fixed effects. Baseline differences and time trend effects are controlled for in all regressions
though not reported. The sample is restricted to individuals whose baseline performance did
not lie above the 90th percentile. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported
in parentheses. Romano-Wolf adjusted q-values correcting for multiple hypotheses testing for
the family of outcomes shown in this table are reported in brackets. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
The augmented treatment including peer characteristics is not statistically differen-
tiable from the simple ranking. But low-performers that observed peer characteristics
react to the treatment more strongly. The joint effect is positive and statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level for hours worked. It is less precise but positive for days worked.
Low-performers that observe that the top seller in their sector is a woman, increase
their effort by 1.26 hours compared to low-performers in the control group that did not
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see their ranking. The effect of the ranking itself is 0.85 hours.20
Table 2.8: Ranking and Peer Info Impact on Cooperation.
Difference-in-difference
Standard dictator game
ATE se
Outcome (1) (2)
Short-term impact
Ranking 2.576*** (0.956)
Positive Signal 2.762*** (0.973)
Ranking × Positive Signal -2.761** (1.227)
Peer Info -0.663 (0.805)
Top Gender 0.298 (0.877)
Peer Info × Top Gender 1.891 (1.398)
Control mean - bottom 2.862
Control mean - top 4.800
Joint test bottom - p-value 0.0034
Joint test top - p-value 0.4739
adjusted r-squared 0.010
Observations (cluster) 477 (249)
Notes: All coefficients are difference-in-differences esti-
mates. All regressions include randomization strata fixed
effects. Baseline differences and time trend effects are con-
trolled for in all regressions though not reported. The sam-
ple is restricted to individuals whose baseline performance
did not lie above the 90th percentile. Standard errors clus-
tered at the individual level. * significant at 10%; ** sig-
nificant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
20As a robustness check to self-reported work hours, I estimate treatment effects for the time that
firm owners open their businesses. During the baseline survey and Survey 2 (four months after the
treatment intervention) we asked firm owners about the time they open and close their business during
a normal week. This measure is likely to be less prone to measurement bias due to recalling error as
opening hours do not vary. As the question is also less salient than the direct effort question, I argue
that it is a valid measure to check the robustness of treatment effects on reported work hours. The
coefficients should be interested as percentage changes of one hour. The results in Table A.5 confirm
the positive impact of the ranking on effort. For all days besides Wednesdays and Saturdays, low-
performers that observed their ranking open their shops between 25 and 48 minutes earlier than their
peers in the control group (statistically significant at minimum at 5% level). Contrary to the results
on reported hours worked, observability of a woman at the top has no effect on effort choices.
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Similarly, individuals that observe a female top seller strongly react to the treatment
by changing their cooperation levels. The joint effect is significant at the 1% level. Low-
performers that observe their ranking together with peer characteristics share 3.8 tokens
more than low-performers in the control group. This corresponds to about one third
of their endowment. These results are driven by changes in the behavior of female
micro-firm owners as shown in Table A.8 of Appendix A. The additional effect of peer
characteristic observability is precise and large for women. I interpret this result as
evidence that especially women receive further information that higher incomes are
attainable and learn from their female peers.
2.5.2.2 Impact on Firm Performance
Observing a woman at the top increases sales of low-performing individuals by 2,025.92MZN
(US$30) compared to low-performers that have observed the ranking only. Not only
is the effect of the treatment on firm outcomes strongest for those that observe peer
characteristics, but the two treatment types are significantly different from each other.
Those that observed a female top seller outperform high-performers in the control group
(excluding top sellers) by 13%. The treatment effects on profits are similar in size though
not statistically significant. The lack in precision might be attributable to the loss in
statistical power as I reduce the sample size by almost 20% when excluding top seller
observations. Importantly, the treatment effect of observing one’s ranking is robust to
controlling for peer characteristic observability. Further, providing information about
peer’s gender contains relevant information for micro-firm owners and reinforces the
positive impact of a ranking itself. Though not necessarily through changes in effort
and cooperation.
95
Ta
bl
e
2.
9:
R
an
ki
ng
an
d
Pe
er
In
fo
Im
pa
ct
on
Fi
rm
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
-w
in
so
riz
ed
ou
tc
om
es
.
D
iff
er
en
ce
-in
-d
iff
er
en
ce
re
gr
es
sio
n
Sa
le
s
Pr
ofi
t
Se
lf-
re
po
rt
ed
pr
ofi
t
AT
E
se
q-
va
lu
e
AT
E
se
q-
va
lu
e
AT
E
se
q-
va
lu
e
O
ut
co
m
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
Pa
ne
lA
:P
oo
led
Sa
m
pl
e
R
an
ki
ng
2,
26
2.
17
0*
**
(8
29
.7
73
)
[0
.0
39
6]
1,
89
5.
46
2*
*
(8
48
.0
63
)
[0
.0
49
5]
1,
16
3.
77
7*
(5
95
.2
65
)
[0
.0
89
1]
Po
sit
iv
e
-3
96
.3
24
(1
,0
04
.3
85
)
[0
.1
58
4]
61
4.
82
0
(1
,1
21
.1
27
)
[0
.7
92
1]
2,
54
6.
04
3*
**
(6
33
.7
32
)
[0
.0
00
0]
R
an
ki
ng
×
Po
sit
iv
e
-1
,8
60
.0
55
(1
,3
02
.9
07
)
[0
.6
73
3]
-1
,9
10
.5
93
(1
,4
26
.3
82
)
[0
.6
73
3]
-1
,1
19
.9
81
(8
81
.7
38
)
[0
.6
73
3]
Pe
er
In
fo
-2
,3
73
.2
71
**
*
(8
31
.7
03
)
[0
.0
29
7]
-1
,3
59
.7
68
(9
55
.8
73
)
[0
.1
38
6]
-8
33
.8
33
(6
66
.3
94
)
[0
.5
94
1]
To
p
G
en
de
r
-1
,3
06
.8
66
*
(7
52
.6
91
)
[0
.0
79
2]
-2
21
.4
91
(8
00
.2
92
)
[0
.2
67
3]
-1
,1
40
.6
56
*
(6
25
.2
40
)
[0
.0
19
8]
Pe
er
In
fo
×
To
p
G
en
de
r
4,
39
9.
19
4*
*
(1
,9
35
.7
54
)
[0
.0
39
6]
2,
33
6.
32
6
(1
,9
34
.1
57
)
[0
.1
08
9]
3,
20
6.
33
4*
*
(1
,3
84
.0
25
)
[0
.0
39
6]
C
on
tr
ol
m
ea
n
-
bo
tt
om
1,
41
4.
87
0
28
8.
75
9
2,
40
9.
45
5
C
on
tr
ol
m
ea
n
-t
op
3,
73
6.
42
7
2,
21
4.
60
0
4,
92
6.
08
3
Jo
in
t
te
st
0.
03
46
0.
14
25
0.
57
42
Jo
in
t
te
st
to
p
0.
21
49
0.
63
38
0.
28
01
ad
j.
r-
sq
.
0.
05
3
0.
02
1
0.
04
0
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
66
8
(2
51
)
66
4
(2
51
)
42
7
(2
39
)
N
ot
es
:
O
ut
co
m
e
m
ea
su
re
s
ar
e
w
in
so
riz
ed
at
th
e
1s
t
an
d
99
th
pe
rc
en
til
e.
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
in
C
ol
um
ns
(1
)
an
d
(4
)
ar
e
di
ffe
re
nc
e-
in
-
di
ffe
re
nc
es
es
tim
at
es
.B
as
el
in
ed
iff
er
en
ce
sa
nd
tim
et
re
nd
eff
ec
ts
ar
ec
on
tr
ol
le
d
fo
ri
n
al
lr
eg
re
ss
io
ns
th
ou
gh
no
tr
ep
or
te
d.
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
in
C
ol
um
n
(7
)
ar
e
O
LS
es
tim
at
es
as
ba
se
lin
e
da
ta
on
se
lf-
re
po
rt
ed
pr
ofi
ts
is
no
t
av
ai
la
bl
e.
A
ll
re
gr
es
sio
ns
in
cl
ud
e
ra
nd
om
iz
at
io
n
st
ra
ta
an
d
su
rv
ey
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
.
T
he
sa
m
pl
e
is
re
st
ric
te
d
to
in
di
vi
du
al
s
w
ho
se
ba
se
lin
e
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
di
d
no
t
lie
ab
ov
e
th
e
90
th
pe
rc
en
til
e.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
in
di
vi
du
al
le
ve
la
re
re
po
rt
ed
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
R
om
an
o-
W
ol
fa
dj
us
te
d
q-
va
lu
es
co
rr
ec
tin
g
fo
r
m
ul
tip
le
hy
po
th
es
es
te
st
in
g
fo
r
th
e
fa
m
ily
of
ou
tc
om
es
sh
ow
n
in
th
is
ta
bl
e
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
*
sig
ni
fic
an
t
at
10
%
;*
*
sig
ni
fic
an
t
at
5%
;*
**
sig
ni
fic
an
t
at
1%
.
96
2.6 Robustness Checks
Survey measures on sales and profits raise two main concerns. First, sales reports
might be subject to misreporting due to recalling error. I minimize this threat by
focusing on sales of the last two days before the interview rather than a whole week
or month. Nevertheless, especially individuals with very low levels of education might
struggle reporting sales data as they are less likely to keep track of their business figures.
Second, and most important, individuals that received a negative signal of their ranking
(information that their performance is below the average) might be more likely to tell
us that they increased their sales. In this case, the firm outcome data would be subject
to measurement error that is correlated with treatment status. I address these concerns
by validating survey measures of sales with enumerator observed sales data.
2.6.1 Validation Measure
At Survey 3, one year after the intervention, we tracked sales of firms during an entire
business day. Enumerators arrived at a firm location around 9am. At baseline, 94%
of firms are open by this time during regular weekdays and on Saturdays (the days
the enumerator team conducted interviews). Survey 3 was administered as soon as
possible and focused on the most important measures to not disrupt normal business
activities. Enumerators then stayed with the firm for the entire day until around 5pm.
For each client that approached the shop, the enumerator tracked the client’s gender
and whether or not a sale was realized. For each sale, the enumerator tracked the type
of product that was sold, the unit price of the product and how many units were sold,
and the total price charged. The total price might differ from the price charged for two
reasons: Firms charge less (round down) due to a lack of change,21 or firms actually
21See Beaman et al. (2014) for experimental field evidence on how a lack of change affects micro-firm
performance.
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Table 2.10: Comparison of Survey and Tracked Sales Means at End-line.
All Control Group Ranking Group
A. Low-Performers
Survey Mean 2149.198 1634.148 2406.722
(3396.458) (1846.434) (3941.765)
Tracked Mean 1639.297 939.25 1983.582
(2973.943) (1102.377) (3509.074)
Correlation Coefficient 0.6045 0.6126 0.6026
B. High-Performers
Survey Mean 2690.206 2503.127 2824.374
(3886.29) (3240.316) (4301.407)
Tracked Mean 1568.144 1691.648 1479.571
(2540.349) (2106.88) (2817.646)
Correlation Coefficient 0.5219 0.2960 0.6164
Notes: Outcome measures are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard
deviations are reported in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%.
charge more than the unit price would suggest. We could not confirm whether the
latter is due to miscalculations or strategic behavior.
2.6.2 Differences Between Survey and Tracked Sales Data
Table 2.10 reports the means of the survey data (sales over the last two days before
the interview) and monitored sales for the full sample, and the control and treatment
groups separately. The respective means are reported for firms in the bottom of the
distribution and the average and top separately as our main concern is the validity
of self-reports of individuals that received negative feedback. I also report correlation
coefficients between the two measures for each respective group.
For low-performers the two measures are strongly correlated with each other with
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an average correlation coefficient of 0.6. The correlation coefficients of the control and
the treatment group are very similar with a coefficient of 0.61 and 0.6 respectively.
There is no misreporting correlated with treatment status for low-performers. For
high-performers self-reports in the control group are less reliable as an indicator of true
sales. One way to test for bias in the treatment effects on survey measures is to take
the difference between survey and tracked sales and regress it on treatment.22 Equation
2.6.1 defines the empirical model to be estimated:
OutcomeSi −OutcomeVi = β0+β1Treati+β2Positivei+β3 (Treati × Positivei)+γ1Genderi+γ2Xi+εi
(2.6.1)
γi controls for gender fixed effects and Xi includes weekday fixed effects. If a
β-coefficient is negative, then treated individuals are more likely to underreport their
sales during the survey. The survey measure would then underestimate the increase
in sales due to the intervention. A positive β-coefficient suggests that survey-based
treatment effects are over-estimated. The estimation results show that none of the co-
efficients on treatment indicators are statistically significant. There is no evidence of
desirability bias for low-performers, and if anything the bias would suggest an under-
estimation of the true treatment effect.23
2.6.3 Results for Tracked Sales Data
As there is no baseline data available for tracked sales I report OLS estimates for the
main treatment effects in Table 2.11. Table 2.12 displays effects for the full specification
controlling for peer characteristic observability for the reduced sample excluding top
22This strategy follows Blattman et al. (2017). The identifying assumption that the tracked sales
data is closer to true sales is met by design as sales were monitored by trained enumerators.
23These results are not displayed but available upon request.
99
sellers.
Table 2.11: Ranking Impact on Firm Performance - winsorized outcome.
OLS regression
Observed sales
ATE se
Outcome (1) (2)
Long-term impact
Ranking 1,149.282** (504.903)
Positive Signal 971.479*** (348.033)
Ranking × Positive Signal -1,485.816** (646.313)
Control mean - bottom 939.25
Control mean - top 1844.73
Joint test - p-value 0.4105
adjusted r-squared 0.009
Observations (cluster) 274
Notes: Outcome measure is winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentile. Coefficients are OLS estimates as baseline data
is not available. All regressions include randomization strata
and survey fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the
individual level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%.
Table 2.11 confirms the findings on self-reported firm outcomes. Observing one’s
ranking increases sales by 1,149MZN (significant at 5% level). This implies that treated
low-performers double their sales compared to low-performers in the control group.
Compared to high-performers in the control group, low-performers that observed their
ranking fully closed the performance gap after one year. The effect on high-performers
in the treatment group is null suggesting that the ranking improves firm performance
of the worst firms without prejudicing high-performers.
The tracked sales data further provides evidence that those that benefit most from
the ranking are individuals that observed peer characteristics. Table 2.12 shows treat-
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ment impacts including indicators for gender observability. The effect of the ranking
itself is robust to controlling for the impact of gender observability.
Table 2.12: Ranking and Peer Info Impact on Firm Performance - winsorized outcome.
OLS regression
Observed sales
ATE se
Outcome (1) (2)
Long-term impact
Ranking 992.897* (574.473)
Positive Signal 599.561 (385.133)
Ranking × Positive Signal -1,306.275* (669.851)
Peer Info 61.386 (552.171)
Top Gender -625.220** (314.777)
Peer Info × Top Gender 1,128.804 (1,130.143)
Control mean - bottom 951.88
Control mean - top 1555.63
Joint test bottom - p-value 0.1011
Joint test top - p-value 0.6694
adjusted r-squared 0.012
Observations (cluster) 220.000
Notes: Outcome measure is winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentile. Coefficients are OLS estimates as baseline
data is not available. All regressions include randomization
strata and survey fixed effects. The sample is restricted to
individuals whose baseline performance did not lie above
the 90th percentile. Standard errors clustered at the indi-
vidual level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%.
2.7 Conclusion
Without full information about the attainability of future incomes, individuals are likely
to misjudge the returns to effort. Increasing cooperation with one’s business network
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might be potentially very costly and unalterable in the future. The relatively high
cost to experimentation might explain why micro-firm owners forego large increases in
income for small changes in behavior. I attempt to elicit the relevance of effort and
cooperation for firm performance by conducting a simple field experiment. Individuals
in the treatment group observe their relative sales in their sector whereas individuals
in the control group receive no additional information. Rankings contain two types
of information for micro-firms: how much others earn with their firms and what the
attainable revenue limit is for those peers, and for firms in the bottom, that their current
practices are likely to be not optimal.
My experimental results generated three facts. First, micro-firm owners react to
negative ranking feedback by changing their effort choices. Micro-firm owners in the
bottom of the distribution significantly increase the amount of hours worked. Second,
the ranking induces low-performing firm owners to cooperate more. Third, changes
in effort and cooperation help low-performers to close the performance gap to high-
performers in the control group by 48%.
These results show that effort and cooperation are relevant determinants of micro-
firm performance. Contrary to general assumptions, firm owners do not optimize over
effort and cooperation, and forego large revenues. Together with recent studies on
business networks by Cai and Szeidl (2018) or Fafchamps and Quinn (2018), this study
suggests that micro-firm owners can potentially learn from their peers, and benefit
from stronger business networks. Interventions fostering network creation and inducing
higher effort levels are potentially cost-effective as shown in this study. Many organi-
zations supporting firm development, collect baseline data on revenues as part of their
program and could share relative performance information at a low cost.
This study furthermore touches upon the impact of peer characteristic observability.
The effect of the ranking seems to be strongest for those individuals that received some
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information about their peers. Although this information was not sufficient to identify
specific individuals, peer’s gender seems to contain relevant information. Although gen-
der observability positively impacts firm outcomes the effects on effort and cooperation
cannot be precisely estimated. This suggests that additional mechanisms, other than
changes in effort and cooperation, drive the observed changes in firm performance.
Further research will have to identify additional channels through which information
on relative rankings affect firm performance. A key question is how such rankings
should be presented most efficiently. Future insights on the impact of business network
interventions randomized on different levels might further generate evidence on general
equilibrium effects of the impact of changes in cooperation and effort. My findings have
implications for policies that support enterprise growth - in particular of those firms
that perform worst.
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Chapter 3
Reference Points and
Entrepreneurship
3.1 Introduction
Micro-enterprises are an important income source of many poor households in devel-
oping countries, yet evidence on the constraints that hold these businesses back from
developing into SMEs and how to relax them is scarce. Productivity gains from human
capital interventions are surprisingly small1 and returns to access to financial capital in
most settings puzzlingly low.2
This raises a number of questions. Are internal constraints binding for the develop-
ment of micro-enterprises? Is an intervention relaxing internal constraints more efficient
than interventions teaching basic business skills? Are there complementarities that can
be achieved by combining both approaches? Perhaps the most important, but difficult,
question to answer is what specific types of internal constraints are most important and
1See McKenzie and Woodruff (2013) for a detailed summary on the returns to traditional business
skills training.
2See de Mel et al. (2014) and Blattman et al. (2014) for two examples of conflicting evidence on
the impact of cash drops on entrepreneurship.
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how to design successful policies to overcome them.
These questions become particularly prevalent in conflict-ridden countries such as
Mozambique. Decades of independent and civil wars, and ongoing conflict between the
incumbent party and the opposition have not only constrained economic resources and
access to education but also impaired the population’s trust in the future. Without
entrepreneurs believing in economic growth and stability it is unlikely that they will set
themselves business objectives that foster investments. Furthermore, a lack of positive
examples and role models to follow will likely restrain higher aspiration levels, leading
to suboptimal business efforts and practices.
We tackle these questions in urban vendor clusters of the greater Maputo area,
i.e. formal street markets in the capital of Mozambique and its neighboring sister city
Matola. Entrepreneurs in these markets typically operate on extremely low profitability
margins, have no formal training, low general education levels, and limited perspectives
for business growth. We identified an experimental sample of approximately 790 market
vendors in these clusters of which 600 were randomly assigned to watch an inspirational
video, additionally learn about and set a “SMART” goal, receive basic business skills
training, neither or a combination of these interventions.
The video documents the path to success of a young male entrepreneur that started
his business career as a street merchant selling school supplies in the city of Maputo.
Without any major external support, he managed to continuously grow his business
and is nowadays the owner of several stores in different market clusters and a two-story
supermarket in a newly constructed neighborhood of Matola. We showed the video
to entrepreneurs individually at their stalls in a separate visit after having collected
baseline information about household and business outcomes. By providing participants
with a new perspective on business growth (through role model exposure) we expect to
shift their reference points and increase vendors’ aspirations in the long run. Aspirations
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are, similarly to self-confidence, expected to translate into greater efficacy, effort, and
ultimately business success through increased sales and profits.
An immediate concern about changing aspirations arises in settings where knowledge
on how to save and invest or set feasible business goals is limited such that higher
aspirations might not necessarily translate into productive behavior. We approach
these limitations by providing vendors with either simple rules-of-thumb to separate
their personal and business expenses, supporting them in developing a business goal to
be achieved over the course of maximum one year, or both. The goal setting intervention
is modeled on standard management practices generally known as “SMART” (Specific,
Measurable, Achievable, Results-focused, Time-bound) goals adapted to the literacy
level of our participants.
To test the impact of our interventions, we returned six months and 14 months after
implementation to collect survey data on psychometric indicators, business practices,
and household and business outcomes. The effects of our simple nudge of watching a
short video are impressively large. Shifting entrepreneurs’ reference points increases
sales by approximately 68% compared to the control group. Additionally providing
them with a goal setting training though diminishes this effect substantially. We cannot
confirm any effects from business skills training by itself. These effects seem to be driven
by three major mechanisms. Our role model intervention significantly increases savings
over both time periods by 34%. These effects are driven by formal savings in bank
accounts. Entrepreneurs that watched our video additionally increase their effort by
working more days per week and having longer shop hours than entrepreneurs in the
control group. Entrepreneurs in both the video group and the extended video group
increase risky behavior as measured by an incentivized lottery question.
Our results expand on recent evidence by Campos et al. (2017) that evaluate the
effectiveness of a personal initiative training versus the effects of basic business and
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marketing skills. Transforming the mindsets of entrepreneurs towards greater innova-
tiveness without providing additional business skills training or cash grants leads to
significant increases of profits by 30%. These results support the idea that internal
constraints might be much more important to entrepreneurial growth than previously
thought. However, the training under examination in this study is a multi-component
treatment that does not allow to evaluate through which channels these constraints
operate, or whether a combination of psychological interventions, and business skills
training might translate higher innovativeness into business success more effectively.
Among internal constraints, aspirations have gained widespread attention as a poten-
tially limiting factor in economic growth. From a theoretical perspective, the idea
that aspirations and economic change might be related was first formalized by Ray
(2006). Building upon this contribution, Genicot and Ray (2017) argue that individ-
ual aspirations are shaped by society-wide economic conditions and that these in turn
affect individual investment incentives. Dalton et al. (2015) again show that aspira-
tions failure is a consequence of poverty that might lead to a behavioral poverty trap.
Bernard et al. (2014) present evidence that suggests a significant impact of aspirations
on forward-looking behavior – an important predictor of business growth. By exposing
study participants to potential role models, the authors find a positive, persistent effect
on aspirations as well as a positive effect of aspirations on children’s education.
This study adds to our understanding of constraints to micro-entrepreneurial busi-
ness growth, particularly the importance of reference points and how to shift them.
Without changing entrepreneurs’ perspectives and business goals first, financial and
human capital interventions are unlikely to yield positive returns.
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3.2 Country Background: Mozambique
The randomized control trial used to answer the research questions examined in this
paper was conducted in Mozambique. These research questions, namely those related
to the impact of internal constraints on micro-enterprise development and to their in-
teraction with the micro-entrepreneurs’ general lack of business skills, are particularly
relevant in conflict-ridden countries such as Mozambique. Recent decades of inde-
pendence and civil wars, and ongoing conflict between the incumbent party and the
opposition have not only constrained economic resources and access to education, but
also impaired the population’s trust in the future. Without entrepreneurs believing
in economic growth and stability, it is unlikely that they will set themselves business
objectives that foster investment and long run business growth – which necessarily re-
quire trading off current for future gains. Furthermore, a lack of positive examples and
role models to follow is likely to restrain micro-entrepreneurs’ higher aspiration levels,
potentially leading to suboptimal business efforts and practices.
Mozambique became independent from the Portuguese colonization in 1975. In the
preceding 10 years, there was an independence war and social unrest that disrupted the
Mozambican economy. Since the end of this war with Portugal in 1975, the country
has been led under a single-party, socialist regime. Two years after independence, the
country’s two major political parties began a very destructive civil war. Estimates
suggest that up to one million people died as a consequence of war and five million
civilians have been displaced. In 2013, the peace agreement signed in 1992 was broken
when upheavals reemerged. Hundreds were killed and displaced, with tensions spiking
in the north and center of the country in 2015 and 2016. Most of the Mozambican
population, around 70% in 2016, live in rural areas from agriculture. These livelihoods
are at constant risk due to recurring natural disasters such as floods. The increasing
climate change is expected to lead to an increase in the occurrence of such disasters.
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As a consequence of both conflict and natural disasters, the country faces high inter-
nal and international migration.3 Most Mozambicans move to the largest Mozambican
cities and to South Africa. Mozambique’s capital, Maputo, is the country’s most pop-
ulous city. Around 9%, 2.7 million, of the Mozambican population live in the Maputo
metropolitan area. There are few formal, salaried jobs. Most workers earn money
through a mix of casual employment and petty businesses. The turnover in these busi-
nesses is high and workers regularly interrupt their business activities. Concentrated
in local market clusters, these entrepreneurs face a high degree of competition. They
have no formal business training, little education, and limited access to capital.
Supporting the development of such businesses is a major concern of the government.
The Mozambican private sector is underdeveloped with only a few large firms4 and
an almost entirely absent SME sector. Most businesses are too small to pay taxes.
Understanding the constraints holding micro-businesses in Mozambique back allows
for government policies that foster SME development and economic growth. As self-
employment is the only income source of many urban households, supporting business
growth is also a poverty alleviation scheme.
3.3 Experimental Design and Implementation
To estimate both the effect of changes in reference points and potential complemen-
tarities of these with goal-setting and business skill training, we used a 2x3 factorial
design, as illustrated in Figure 3.3.1.
3See Batista and Vicente (2018) for further evidence on the relationship between natural disasters
and migration in Mozambique.
4See the Enterprise Mapping made by Sutton for the IGC.
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Figure 3.3.1: 2X3 Experimental Design.
PLACEBO VIDEO VIDEO ONLY VIDEO + GOALS
CONTROL 98 vendors 96 vendors 98 vendors
BUSINESS SKILLS 98 vendors 89 vendors 89 vendors
3.3.1 Interventions
3.3.1.1 Aspirations Video
The video showcases the successful career and business development of Sr. Tivane. He is
a young entrepreneur that developed from a street vendor to a businessman with several
shops and a grocery store spanning two floors. His shops are located in markets that are
not included in our sample. None of the entrepreneurs that watched the video indicated
that they knew his story before the video. The video shows several sequences of the
neighborhood and the store of Sr. Tivane while a narrator describes his way of success.
They are complemented with interview sequences with the owner himself, his wife, a
development worker, and the country director of the Associação NOVAFRICA para o
Desenvolvimento Empresarial e Económico de Moçambique (NOVAFRICA Association
for Mozambican Business and Economic Development). The statements emphasize the
success of Sr. Tivane as a businessman and potential role model. There was minimal
framing on how to imitate his success. The video is explicit in the importance of
ambitions to grow a business and get out of poverty.
Role Model Background and Pilot We piloted videos about four different en-
trepreneurs. The video about Sr. Tivane proved to be most successful in inspiring
entrepreneurs. The pilot group identified with the role model. Much like the majority
of our sample, Sr. Tivane has little education and no formal business training. He
started his career as a flying vendor selling school products in the streets of Maputo.
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He then managed to rent a stall in one of the markets and grew his business successively.
At the same time, his business is sufficiently developed to mark a significant difference
between our experimental sample and our role model. He has several employees that
run his shops in urban markets in Maputo and the grocery store in his neighborhood.
Implementation and Aims The runtime of the video is 8 minutes – this seemed
to be the approximate time span for which the treatment group remained engaged and
attentive. The video was shown individually on tablets with headphones. We visited
vendors during their business hours at their shops. The video was followed by a brief
discussion of the video content with the trainer. The video was designed to encourage
two types of change: First, it increases aspirations – forward-looking reference points
– by providing information on the attainability of entrepreneurial success. Bernard
et al. (2014) have shown that aspirations influence behavior and that they respond
to interventions. These empirical results validate theoretical models about the role
of aspirations for savings and investments (Genicot and Ray (2017)). Second, the
video describes in detail the intrinsic motivation and ambitions of our role model. It
increases self-efficiency by emphasizing the importance of own effort. The narrative
tried to convince entrepreneurs that our role model’s business success was not a result
of external help or luck.
3.3.1.2 Goal Setting
We adapted the SMART goal setting approach to the context of micro-entrepreneurs
to strengthen their goal setting behavior. The acronym defines a desirable goal as one
that is specific, measurable, attributable, realistic, and time-sensitive. The trainers first
explained the concept of a SMART goal with examples of fictional characters. Each
entrepreneur was then asked to select a goal for their own business. The training then
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followed the SMART scheme in specifying the objective and respective cost. Based
on the overall cost and the responsible’s monthly savings capacity the trainer helped
define a financing model. If the initial goal was deemed unrealistic for the next year, the
entrepreneur was asked to revise and choose a different goal. We left a hand-written
copy of the goal achievement plan and a leaflet explaining the definition of SMART
goals with the entrepreneur.
3.3.1.3 Placebo Video
We produced a short video in Portuguese about the Limpopo National Park. The
purpose of this video is to ensure that any effects found on aspirations and business
outcomes of individuals are not driven by the experience of watching a video itself.5
The placebo video is similar in length to the aspirations video. It was displayed on
tablets and with headphones as well.
3.3.1.4 Basic Skills Training
The business skills training is an adaptation of the rules-of-thumb approach by Drexler
et al. (2014). Instead of providing entrepreneurs with complex accounting and financial
literacy skills, the rules-of-thumb approach provides entrepreneurs with simple rules
on how to run their business. We focus on four main lessons: First, the trainer ex-
plains the importance of separating business and household accounts. Keeping busi-
ness money apart helps entrepreneurs calculate their profits and evaluate their business
performance. A central mechanism, however, is nudging entrepreneurs into mental
accounting. Mental accounting increases business savings6 and investments, and thus
subsequently business growth. The trainer then explains that money for different pur-
5Bernard et al. (2015) provide a detailed exposition of the importance of placebo treatments with
video interventions.
6See Thaler (1999) for a detailed exposition on mental accounting.
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poses should not only be stored separately but also safely. We provide each entrepreneur
with two money pouches to increase adoption of these rules. The third rule asks en-
trepreneurs to establish a salary for themselves based on their needs and business in-
come. The last rule allows entrepreneurs to borrow money from their business account
for their household as long as it is paid back within seven days. The training was pro-
vided individually at the business. We left a leaflet with a summary of the training in
Portuguese7 and a flyer with the four rules of thumb with each entrepreneur after the
training.
3.3.2 Sampling, data collection and experimental implemen-
tation
3.3.2.1 Sampling
We randomly selected about 600 micro-entrepreneurs in different markets to partic-
ipate in our study. With no reliable administrative data on the universe of micro-
entrepreneurs in the metropolitan area of Maputo, we set out to obtain census data for
a representative sample of market vendors. In 2016, 82 markets were officially regis-
tered. We focused our sample on markets located in the cities of Maputo and Matola.
We excluded markets located outside these city borders as depicted in Figure 3.3.2 and
the island of Inhaca. We further excluded markets that were indicated on our adminis-
trative list and confirmed by our local RA team to have less than 100 vendors. Due to
security concerns we also excluded two informal markets. The sampling strategy at this
stage then followed neighborhood market clusters. In areas where we could not find the
initial market or it had moved we proceeded with a census of market vendors in the new
7Over 94% of our sample indicate that they speak Portuguese. As Changana, the second most
spoken language in the Maputo region, is mostly a spoken language but rarely written, we decided to
provide our supporting material in one language only.
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Figure 3.3.2: Maputo Metropolitan Area.
Source: JICA Report (2014)
local market. In total, we obtained a representative sample of 3.136 market vendors
in 33 different markets. This represents approximately 76% of all markets within our
sampling framework.
Most of these markets are organized in designated open-air areas. They serve the
population in the respective neighborhood and supply groceries, clothes, household
and construction goods. Vendors in these markets typically sell in structures similar
to small stalls or on benches. The most advanced shops are covered and lockable, and
have access to electricity. Other shops barely have a roof or walls, and vendors collect
their products at the end of the day to take them home. We only sampled businesses
with a designated vending area. Flying vendors with movable carts that switch between
different markets are excluded.
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For these 3.136 market vendors we obtained census data on individual characteristics
relevant to our interventions. During the census we recorded the name of the shop owner
or managing staff, their age, gender, nationality, and whether they had basic literacy.
We furthermore obtained data on their perspective of remaining active in the respective
market during the next year, their consent to participate in our study, as well as the
location of the shop and the shop responsible’s contact details.
We applied the following exclusion restrictions: Due to possible identification prob-
lems with our Mozambican role model, we excluded all foreign market vendors; All
market vendors with a business horizon of less than a year and more than 50 years
old8 were excluded from the sample; Due to business type homogeneity, we excluded all
fruit/vegetable sellers, restaurants, bars, and kiosks, as well as any shops selling illegal
products, traditional medicine, or wholesale merchants.
Applying these eligibility criteria, we obtained a representative subsample of 788
market vendors in 32 markets. We proceeded by randomly selecting 624 market ven-
dors in 29 markets for the baseline survey. Three markets were excluded as less than
six vendors meeting our requirements operated on those markets. During our treat-
ment visit we were able to located 568 vendors, 95% of our sample, again. Treatment
allocation was randomized on the individual unit and stratified by market clusters.
3.3.2.2 Experimental implementation
As illustrated in Figure 3.3.3 the baseline survey took place one month after the census.
We randomized entrepreneurs by computerized assignment conditional on a com-
pleted baseline survey.9 We completed baseline surveys for 600 individuals. Treatment
8Between 2010 and 2015, life expectancy at birth in Mozambique was 56 years according to the
United Nations Population Division report “World Population Prospects” (2017).
9Around 3.8% of the interviews conducted at baseline were not completed as entrepreneurs inter-
rupted the interview and were not willing to continue. One entrepreneur had to be excluded from the
sample due to religious reasons that did not allow him to participate in the dictator games or watch
a video. Given that all entrepreneurs either saw the role model video or the placebo he could not
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Figure 3.3.3: Project Timeline.
2016 2017
Activity 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Census
Baseline
Treatment
6-month survey
End-line
assignment was stratified by market clusters. The training visits took place in the
month after the completion of all baseline surveys. We ran end-line surveys 6 months
and 13-14 months after the training visits.
Balance We could find 94.6% of our baseline sample during the treatment visit. This
resulted in 16.9% assignment to the role model video only, 17.25% to the role model
video with goal setting training, 17.25% to the rules-of-thumb training only, 15.67% to
the role model video and rules-of-thumb training, 15.67% to the group that received
all components, and 17.25% to neither. Figure 3.3.1 illustrates this distribution. Table
3.1 reports balance tests for each treatment for select covariates.
3.3.2.3 Data Collection and Measurement Strategies
We tried to survey each firm owner four times: 1) at baseline before the training
visit, 2) during the training visit for additional baseline data on business outcomes and
immediate effects on psychometric indicators, 3) “short-run” surveys 6 months after the
training, and 4) at end-line 13-14 months after the training. Subjects also conducted a
set of incentivized dictator and risk aversion games after the baseline and “short-run”
survey. For the following analysis we restrict our sample to subjects that were present
during the training visit. Of those, we collected data on 86% at the 6-month visit and
participate in the study.
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80% at the end-line visit.
On average participants are 33 years old. Almost half of our sample is composed of
women. Vendors spent approximately 8 years in school, providing them with less than
high-school education. Only eleven percent of participants have ever received formal
training in their business area and households are composed of six members on average.
Two and a half of these household members are dependents - this includes biological
children and other minors living in the same household. Vendors that watched the
video and received business skills training are slightly more likely to live in households
with many children.
Businesses have on average 0.3 employees. Business owners are personally in charge
of their stalls 6.4 days during a normal week. Each day they work almost 10 hours.
This effort translates into 1.873Mts in sales (this is equivalent to US$12 applying the
2016 exchange rate average at the time of the baseline survey). The reported sales are
the median sales during the week prior to our baseline visit. This control for outlier
sales days. Median profits are slightly higher for the treatment group that received all
components of our intervention.
3.3.3 Key Outcomes
We focus our analysis on four main groups of outcomes: one final outcome group –
business outcomes – and three intermediate outcome groups that drive final outcomes.
The core hypotheses and potential mechanisms were outlined in a 2015 International
Growth Center proposal. We report treatment effects for all time periods where the
respective measure is available. We also estimate the pooled treatment effect over the
“short-run” and end-line survey. This strategy allows us to understand the dynamic
effects of our trainings and estimate more precise effects by increasing statistical power
when more than one post-training period is available.
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Business outcomes focus on an entrepreneur’s sales and profits. We asked subjects
to indicate their sales for the week prior to the interview by day and product category.
This strategy is less prone to recalling error than asking about an entrepreneur’s total
sales over the last week. Expenditures are reported following the same strategy. We
calculate profits as the difference between sales and expenditures. Our results are robust
to different sales measures. In Table 3.2 we report treatment effects for sales and profits
for the last three days prior to the interview date and self-reported profits10 over the
last month.
The main intermediate outcome group is changes in forward-looking behavior. We
asked subjects about their total savings as well as savings amounts that are stored
with others, at bank accounts, and at home. We also asked subjects whether they
had invested any money in their business and if so how much. We complement this
data with self-reports on having business objectives and goals, and an incentivized risk
aversion measure.
We measure effort as the number of days a subject is personally taking care of the
shop. As this indicator is self-reported, we complement it with the total opening hours
of the shop over the week. We interpret indicators on client management as further
measures of individual effort. Our trainings could furthermore affect business outcomes
by incentivizing subjects to obtain skills training. We estimate effects on changes in
business practices in three dimensions: the likelihood on keeping books about sales,
clients buying on credit, and product inventory; computing business measures; and
whether subjects took out any business money for personal expenses.
10The exact phrasing of the question (translated from Portuguese) was “How much of your sales
did you have left over after paying all expenses of your business last month?”. Subjects that did not
know the exact amount were asked to indicate one out of seven profit bins. We use the median of each
bin as profit value whenever the subject did not indicate the exact value. Our estimates are robust to
estimating treatment effects on profit bins rather than absolute values.
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3.4 Identification Strategy
Given our experimental design, we estimate the coefficients of interest as average treat-
ment effects (ATE) using the following Difference-in-Differences specification:
Yit = θ + αTit + γPost+ β[Tit×Post] + δXit + it (3.4.1)
Where Yit is the outcome of interest for individual i at survey round t, and Xit is
a vector of controls that includes market fixed effects and survey round fixed effects -
where the latter apply only for the pooled sample specification. Yit is the pooled effect
of the 6-month and the end-line survey values in those specifications where both time
periods are available.
β = [βV βV GβSβV SβV GS] (3.4.2)
is the vector of treatment effects, where V denotes the Video intervention, G stands
for the goal-setting intervention, and S represents the skill-training intervention.
Tit = [(V ideoit)(V ideoGoalit)(Skillsit)(V ideoit×Skillsit)(V ideoGoalit×Skillsit)]
(3.4.3)
is a vector of dummy variables representing (random) assignment to the three main
treatment arms. In the full specification, interaction terms are also included.
For all outcomes variables, we report the main effects and the full specification
separately. The main effects are the ATE from random assignment to watching the
aspirations video; watching the video and receiving the goal setting treatment; and
rules-of-thumb training. The interaction term estimates the additional effect of the
rules-of-thumb training on the effect of watching the video (or watching the video and
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receive goal setting treatment). Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual
level - our unit of randomization.11 To reduce sensitivity to outliers, we winsorized
outcome data on sales, profits, and savings at the 1st and 99th percentile. We estimate
2.6.1 using OLS for continuous dependent variables, and Probit for all binary outcomes.
3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Firm Performance
We measure firm performance using three distinct outcome measures: self-reported
sales, calculated profits, and self-reported profits. Table 3.2 reports the impact on sales
of the three treatment arms in columns (1), (3), and (5). Effect size is shown in Meticais
– the local currency.
Table 3.2: Treatment Effects on Firm Performance.
(a) Pooled Effects.
Dependent Variable: Sales Profit
ATE se ATE se
(1) (2) (3) (4)
video – βV 1.207*** (0.405) 0.888** (0.373)
video & goal – βV G 0.755* (0.388) 0.367 (0.371)
skills training – βS 0.428 (0.405) 0.102 (0.383)
video * skills training – βV S -1.198** (0.603) -1.002* (0.518)
video & goal * skills training – βV GS -0.641 (0.615) 0.149 (0.506)
mean dep. variable post-treatment 7.674 7.249
βV G − βV = 0 F-stat 0.307 0.099
βV + βS + βV S = 0 F-stat 0.265 0.977
βV G + βS + βV GS = 0 F-stat 0.208 0.116
r-squared adjusted 0.032 0.030
number of observations (cluster) 1,403 892
11We follow Abadie et al. (2017) in our reasoning for clustering standard errors at the individual
level.
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In the short run, sales increased among those that received either of the two train-
ings focused on changes in reference points. Surprisingly, the more comprehensive
intervention that includes goal setting training yields smaller effects than the simple
intervention. Additionally training subjects on goal setting and establishing a busi-
ness goal decreases the positive effect from improved aspirations on sales. The same
conclusions hold when pooling over both survey rounds with no improvements over
precision for winsorized outcomes. Changing subjects’ reference points increases sales
by approximately 40% compared to the control group that watched a placebo video.
The impact of our role model video on sales is significant at the 5% level. Our results
on the impact of our video alone are robust to the inclusion of interaction terms. We
discuss the impact of the interaction terms in detail in Section 3.7.1.
Table 3.2: Treatment Effects on Firm Performance.
(b) 6-months Effects.
Dependent Variable: Sales Profit
ATE se ATE se
(1) (2) (3) (4)
video – βV 1.362*** (0.511) 0.460 (0.513)
video & goal – βV G 0.921* (0.518) -0.137 (0.521)
skills training – βS 0.567 (0.499) -0.413 (0.522)
video * skills training – βV S -1.352* (0.728) -0.670 (0.734)
video & goal * skills training – βV GS -0.461 (0.715) 0.647 (0.715)
mean dep. variable post-treatment 7.706 7.525
βV G − βV = 0 F-stat 0.413 0.204
βV + βS + βV S = 0 F-stat 0.252 0.266
βV G + βS + βV GS = 0 F-stat 0.033 0.859
r-squared adjusted 0.030 0.035
number of observations (cluster) 985 466
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Table 3.2: Treatment Effects on Firm Performance.
(c) One-year Effects.
Dependent Variable: Sales Profit
ATE se ATE se
(1) (2) (3) (4)
video – βV 1.057** (0.441) 1.217** (0.488)
video & goal – βV G 0.569 (0.416) 0.904* (0.499)
skills training – βS 0.289 (0.489) 0.664 (0.543)
video * skills training – βV S -1.021 (0.696) -1.337* (0.711)
video & goal * skills training – βV GS -0.852 (0.734) -0.442 (0.705)
mean dep. variable post-treatment 7.870 6.974
βV G − βV = 0 F-stat 0.294 0.450
βV + βS + βV S = 0 F-stat 0.473 0.325
βV G + βS + βV GS = 0 F-stat 0.991 0.034
r-squared adjusted 0.030 0.037
number of observations (cluster) 922 426
Notes: Outcomes are inverse hyperbolic sine transformations of sales over the last
two days prior to interview and self-reported profits as described in the text. All
regressions on sales are difference-in-difference estimations. Regressions on profit are
OLS as baseline measures are not available. Survey round fixed effects are included
for all pooled regressions. Columns (1) and (3) display ATEs of each intervention. βV
is the treatment effect for all individuals that have seen the video but not received
goal setting training. βVG is the treatment effect for all individuals that have seen
the video and received goal setting training. βS equals one for all individuals that
received rules-of-thumb training. βVS determines the additional effect of receiving skills
training on watching the video for individuals that only watched the video. βVGS is
the additional effect of receiving skills training on watching the video and receiving goal
setting training. P-values of the respective linear hypothesis tests for joint effects are
reported below coefficients. Columns (2) and (4) show standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
As we did not obtain data on self-reported profits at baseline, the results in Table
3.2 provide OLS estimates for post-treatment periods only. Although not statistically
significant, the video raises self-reported profits in the short-run. The impact for those
that also established a goal is close to zero. We find positive impacts of the video
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significant at the 5% level on profits in the pooled sample. Those that watched the
video increased profits by almost 26% compared to the control group. We do not find
significant impacts of the enhanced video intervention or the rules-of-thumb training
on profits.
These results are puzzling as the general opinion tends to favor holistic entrepreneur-
ship programs over small nudges. It is also surprising that our effects increase over time
instead of fading out. Our initial hypothesis stated that goal setting training supports
micro-entrepreneurs in achieving the goals they set themselves. By ensuring that goals
are realistic and developing a plan on how to achieve them, subjects should find it
easier to translate higher aspirations into business success. A potential explanation for
our findings could be constrained reference points. By enhancing subjects’ focus on
one specific goal we might limit changes in forward-looking behavior towards this goal.
To see this, we assess forward-looking behavior in three ways. We estimate dynamic
treatment effects on savings, and specifically types of savings. Given the heterogeneity
of productive investments by business type we estimate the impact on the likelihood of
investments in the last six months and the invested amount.
3.5.2 Forward-Looking Behavior
Table 3.3 reports treatment effects on intermediary outcomes related to forward-looking
behavior. For continuous variables we provide difference-in-differences estimates with
standard errors clustered at the unit of randomization, the individual. For design
purposes we collected end-line data only for our main outcome variables of interest. We
estimate probit difference-in-differences effects for binary outcome measures.
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3.5.2.1 Savings
We report the total amount of savings in Meticais in bank accounts in Column (1)
of Table 3.3. In the short-run, increases in aspirations lead to increases in savings.
These effects are significant at the 5% and the 1% level for the video only and the
enhanced video group, respectively. The amount saved is higher for those that watched
the video and also set a specific goal. Watching the video only increases savings by
112% compared to the control group after 6 months. Those that also set a specific goal
have 119% more savings than the control group. The positive impact of rules-of-thumb
training on savings is not distinguishable from zero.
3.5.2.2 Forward-Looking Business Practices
Business Goals and Sales Objective We also ask subjects if they have established
a business goal for the next six months. Respondents were free to indicate any type
and number of goals they wanted. We assess the impact of our interventions on the
likelihood of having established any business goal. Results are shown in Column (3)
of Table 3.3. Those that watched the video are more likely to have a goal for their
business and a sales objective.
3.5.3 Effort
Higher business ambitions, nudged by the video, might also trigger increases in effort.
We assess the impact of aspiration changes on effort on two dimensions: working hours
and shop opening hours.
3.5.3.1 Working Hours
We collected data on two measures of effort in relation to working hours. First, we
asked subjects to indicate how many days per week they personally take care of their
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Table 3.4: Treatment Effects on Effort.
(a) Pooled Effects.
Dependent Variable: Workdays per Week
ATE se
(1) (2)
video – βV 0.313** (0.147)
video & goal – βV G 0.105 (0.130)
skills training – βS 0.150 (0.127)
video * skills training – βV S -0.101 (0.257)
video & goal * skills training – βV GS -0.185 (0.202)
mean dep. variable post-treatment 6.277
βV G − βV = 0 F-stat p-value 0.246
βV + βS + βV S = 0 F-stat p-value 0.052
βV G + βS + βV GS = 0 F-stat p-value 0.560
r-squared adjusted 0.006
number of observations (cluster) 1,470
business. As we cannot assess the quality of effort during business hours, we focus on
the extensive margin of work effort. Our results are reported in Table 3.4. At the short-
run, subjects in either aspirations intervention group significantly increase their effort
after controlling for interaction effects of treatments. Subjects in both groups work
around 0.3 days more (significant at the 5% level) than the control group. After one
year, this effect fades off for subjects that received goal setting treatment. The impact
on their effort level though equally strong in the beginning, is short lived. Those that
only watched the video maintain their higher effort level at approximately the same
magnitude even one year after the intervention. This effect can be precisely estimated
at the 5% level (10% level after including interaction terms).
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Table 3.4: Treatment Effects on Effort.
(c) One-year Effects.
Dependent Variable: Workdays per Week
ATE se
(1) (2)
video – βV 0.310* (0.168)
video & goal – βV G -0.089 (0.185)
skills training – βS 0.103 (0.158)
video * skills training – βV S 0.031 (0.279)
video & goal * skills training – βV GS -0.054 (0.269)
mean dep. variable post-treatment 6.310
βV G − βV = 0 F-stat p-value 0.073
βV + βS + βV S = 0 F-stat p-value 0.022
βV G + βS + βV GS = 0 F-stat p-value 0.812
r-squared adjusted 0.005
number of observations (cluster) 983
Notes: All regressions are difference-in-difference estimations. Survey round fixed ef-
fects are included for all pooled regressions. Column (1) displays ATEs of each inter-
vention. βV is the treatment effect for all individuals that have seen the video but not
received goal setting training. βVG is the treatment effect for all individuals that have
seen the video and received goal setting training. βS equals one for all individuals that
received rules-of-thumb training. βVS determines the additional effect of receiving skills
training on watching the video for individuals that only watched the video. βVGS is
the additional effect of receiving skills training on watching the video and receiving goal
setting training. P-values of the respective linear hypothesis tests for joint effects are
reported below coefficients. Columns (2) and (4) show standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
This measure is self-reported and might thus give reason to concerns if measurement
error for this outcome is correlated with treatment status. We confirm our results with
a less salient measure on business hours. For each day of the week we collect data
on shop opening and closing hours. We then compute the total amount of hours (in
minutes) the business is operating. The results on this exercise are reported in column
(3) of Table 3.4b. Our estimates confirm our previous results. Those that received
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any of our aspirations treatments work approximately 4.2 hours more than the control
group. These effects are significant at the 5% level. Controlling for interaction terms
those that watched the video only work about 6.5 hours more, and the second group 6
hours more than the control group (both significant at the 5% level).
3.5.4 Business Practices
A further explanation for the positive impact of role models on firm performance could
be improved business skills. Higher aspirations could encourage entrepreneurs to seek
out better skills. If so, we should observe positive effects of our interventions on business
practices. We estimate effects for a family of business practices measures that are
covered in traditional entrepreneurship programs.
3.5.4.1 Bookkeeping
Columns (1) – (6) in Table 3.5 show short-term effects on keeping track of sales, clients
that buy on credit, and product inventory. Those that watched the video are more
likely (significant at 5% level) to have books on clients that buy on credit and their
product inventory. Those that watched the video and received goal setting treatment
do not change their bookkeeping practices.
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3.5.4.2 Taking Business Money
The rules-of-thumb training focuses on the importance of separating business and house-
hold accounts. To assess whether subjects adopted the taught practices we collect
self-reported data on whether entrepreneurs took any money from the business to pay
household expenses during the last six months. This framing is less salient than the
direct question of whether subjects separate accounts. Six months after the training,
subjects in the rules-of-thumb group are less likely to have taken money from the busi-
ness to pay household expenses. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level
after controlling for interaction effects. None of our aspirations treatments have an
impact on taking business money.
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Table 3.6: Treatment Effects on Adoption of Skills Training.
Dependent Variable: Take money from business
ATE se
(1) (2)
video – βV -0.070 (0.060)
video & goal – βV G -0.071 (0.061)
skills training – βS -0.186*** (0.069)
video * skills training – βV S 0.227** (0.094)
video & goal * skills training – βV GS 0.110 (0.099)
mean dep. variable post-treatment 0.863
βV G − βV = 0 F-stat 0.987
βV + βS + βV S = 0 F-stat 0.653
βV G + βS + βV GS = 0 F-stat 0.035
r-squared adjusted 0.010
number of observations (cluster) 454
Notes: Regression is OLS estimates of a Linear Probability Model. Estimates are only
available for 6-month survey. Column (1) displays ATEs of each intervention. βV
is the treatment effect for all individuals that have seen the video but not received
goal setting training. βVG is the treatment effect for all individuals that have seen
the video and received goal setting training. βS equals one for all individuals that
received rules-of-thumb training. βVS determines the additional effect of receiving skills
training on watching the video for individuals that only watched the video. βVGS is
the additional effect of receiving skills training on watching the video and receiving goal
setting training. P-values of the respective linear hypothesis tests for joint effects are
reported below coefficients. Columns (2) and (4) show standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
3.6 Potential Threats to identification
Self-reported Business Data Self-reported measures of sales and profits are a
threat to identification if measurement error is correlated with treatment status. In
our design, sales measures might be prone to measurement error in two ways: first,
treated subjects might become better in tracking their sales due to an increased skill
set; and second, treated subjects might misreport sales out of compliance desires. In
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the absence of administrative data, we developed a sales measure to validate survey
measures of business outcomes through actual sales observation and recording. Section
2.6 reports the approach and measure in detail. Self-reported business data is strongly
correlated with observed sales. There is no systematic difference in this correlation
across treatments. It is thus unlikely that our results are driven by a compliance bias
and motivational lying.
Spillovers Our estimates might be biased in the presence of spillovers. We do not
have the research design to estimate equilibrium effects from an increase in competition.
Nevertheless, the majority of our sample operates in large market clusters where equi-
librium effects are unlikely to drive our results. The mechanisms explaining treatment
effects on sales are furthermore largely independent from equilibrium effects. Spillovers
between treatment arms where subjects learn from or inspire each other would lead us
to underestimate our effects. As we have no reliable data on social networks within
these markets we cannot estimate this effect. The two effects, if present, should cancel
each other out.
3.7 Is skills training a substitute or a complement
to aspirations?
Our experimental design allows us to estimate complementarity effects of skills training
on changes in reference points. Given the sample size of our study we are only pow-
ered to detect large effects. As additionally providing skills training is substantially
costlier than our aspirations interventions alone, we believe this exercise is still worth-
while. If complementarity effects are small it would not be cost-efficient to provide
such additional trainings. The respective results are reported in the same tables as
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the main effects. The interaction terms can be interpreted as the additional impact of
rules-of-thumb training on the respective aspirations treatment.
3.7.1 Firm Performance
Effects on firm performance are shown in Table 3.2. Additionally training subjects on
rules-of-thumb has a negative impact on sales. Effects are significant at the 5% level
on the short-run only for those that also received goal setting treatment. The negative
impact is substantial. It offsets the gains from the video and goal setting treatment
entirely (though not statistically significant).
Impacts on self-reported profits are slightly more positive. The additional impact
from skills training in the short-run is not distinguishable from zero. One year after the
training, additional rules-of-thumb training significantly (5% level) reduces profits for
those that watched the video only. The additional effect of the rules-of-thumb training
is not larger than the effect of the video and the skills training combined.
3.7.2 Effort
The general treatment effect on effort is reduced by additional skills training. Those
subjects that received training on rules-of-thumb exert consistently less effort than those
that have watched the video only. Similarly, those that received skills and goal setting
training work less hours than those that did not learn about the rules-of-thumb (not
statistically significant).
3.7.3 Business Practices
Our results in Table 3.5 provide evidence that subjects with skills training are less
likely to keep track about clients buying on credit and their product inventory than
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their peers that watched the video only.
These results suggest that additional skills training is a substitute to aspirations
interventions rather than a complement. A potential explanation could be that sepa-
rating accounts is less costly than increasing aspirations. Defining and executing a plan
to fulfill personal ambitions requires a higher level of cognitive effort. In our setting the
impact of rules-of-thumb is limited. Focusing cognitive effort in applying the learned
rules rather than translating ambitions into actions can potentially explain the negative
impact of additional skills training.
3.8 Discussion and Implications
Increasing the productivity of micro-entrepreneurs is a major challenge for policy mak-
ers, international institutions, and NGOs. Mozambique is currently highly dependent
on its coal and aluminum exports, and private sector development is still lagging behind.
Existing evidence has provided little guidance for stakeholders on how a transformation
of micro-enterprises into productive SMEs can be achieved. This paper provides novel
insights on the importance of reference points for business success. Increasing aspira-
tions and shifting reference points can substantially increase profitability of enterprises
that have formerly operated on low profit margins.
We estimate the impact of video exposure to a role model, additional goal setting
treatment, and rules-of-thumb on sales, calculated profits, and self-reported profits.
Nudging a change in reference points through a video intervention increases sales by
40% and profits by 29% compared to a control group. Effects are observable both in
the short-run and over the course of one year. This effect is driven by statistically
significant changes in forward-looking behavior and effort. Subjects that watched the
video save more, are more likely to have sales and business goals, work more hours and
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show improved client management. There is some evidence that those subjects improve
bookkeeping on a subset of dimensions but not in computing key business measures.
In the short-run, we find similar results on effort for those that additionally received
goal setting training. These effects, on the contrary to the group that watched the video
only, disappear over time. Although the positive effects on savings are similar for this
group, they translate into higher business outcomes in the short-run only.
We find no or negative effects of rules-of-thumb training on any of these outcomes.
Finally, we examine the joint effect of the different interventions and their complemen-
tarities. Providing skills training crowds out the positive effects of changing reference
points for most of our outcomes. A possible explanation could be the cognitive cost of
realizing higher ambitions compared to implementing simple rules-of-thumb.
Our evidence supports the view that internal constraints limit micro-entrepreneurs
in their business ambitions and from exploiting positive returns to human capital inter-
ventions. While much of the literature has focused on the theoretical concepts behind
a behavioral firm and the role of reference points for savings decisions in insurance
contexts, we are the first to document experimentally the interaction between reference
points and business success.
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Table A.4: Ranking and Peer Info Impact on Effort - winsorized outcomes.
Difference-in-difference regression
Hours worked Days worked
ATE se q-value ATE se q-value
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B: Short-term impact
Ranking 0.920** (0.397) [0.0099] 0.228 (0.168) [0.2673]
Positive Signal 0.434 (0.420) [0.2376] 0.298 (0.251) [0.2376]
Ranking × Positive Signal -1.091** (0.498) [0.0396] -0.151 (0.305) [0.5248]
Peer Info 0.008 (0.285) [0.8911] -0.067 (0.200) [0.9802]
Top Gender -0.056 (0.345) [0.8614] 0.101 (0.234) [0.7030]
Peer Info × Top Gender 0.121 (0.506) [0.8812] 0.114 (0.433) [0.8812]
Control mean - bottom 9.400 6.200
Control mean - top 9.825 6.179
Joint test bottom - p-value 0.0412 0.4578
Joint test top - p-value 0.9371 0.8126
adjusted r-squared 0.071 0.008
Observations (cluster) 479 (251) 478 (251)
Panel C: One-year impact
Ranking 0.747 (0.534) [0.1287] 0.633* (0.351) [0.1188]
Positive Signal 0.686 (0.452) [0.1188] 0.748* (0.390) [0.1188]
Ranking × Positive Signal -1.105* (0.568) [0.0792] -0.679 (0.441) [0.0792]
Peer Info -0.093 (0.338) [0.8812] 0.009 (0.256) [0.9406]
Top Gender -0.639 (0.472) [0.1287] -0.164 (0.344) [0.5446]
Peer Info × Top Gender 0.850 (0.644) [0.6238] 0.261 (0.496) [0.6238]
Control mean - bottom 9.20 5.72
Control mean - top 9.92 6.16
Joint test bottom - p-value 0.0241 0.0952
Joint test top - p-value 0.4994 0.6879
adjusted r-squared 0.046 -0.002
Observations (cluster) 456 (251) 455 (251)
Notes: Outcome measures are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All coefficients are
difference-in-differences estimates. Baseline differences and time trend effects are controlled
for in all regressions though not reported. All regressions include randomization strata and
survey fixed effects. Panel B reports treatment effects after four months. Panel C reports
treatment effects after one year. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported
in parentheses. Romano-Wolf adjusted q-values correcting for multiple hypotheses testing for
the family of outcomes shown in this table are reported in brackets. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 154
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